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Summary
This paper explores goal-directed proof search in first-order multi-modal logic. The key issue
is to design a proof system that respects the modularity and locality of assumptions of many
modal logics. By forcing ambiguities to be considered independently, modular disjunctions
in particular can be used to construct efficiently executable specifications in reasoning tasks
involving partial information that otherwise might require prohibitive search. To achieve this
behavior requires prior proof-theoretic justifications of logic programming to be extended,
strengthened, and combined with proof-theoretic analyses of modal deduction in a novel way.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the proof-theoretic interaction between the goal-directed application of log-
ical inferences and information-flow—that is, the possible connections between assumptions and
conclusions in proofs. My own starting-point for this exploration was the result of [Stone, 1999],
that intuitionistic sequent calculi can be formulated so as exhibit the characteristically intuition-
istic modular information-flow (as underlying the correspondence between proofs and programs
[Howard, 1980], for example) while nevertheless allowing logical inferences to be applied in any
order whatsoever. This raises the question whether it is possible to enforce this kind of modularity
incrementally during goal-directed proof search. Of course, the well-known flexibility of deduc-
tion in nonclassical logics [Fitting, 1972, Fitting, 1983, Wallen, 1990] is ample motivation for the
question.
1.1 Problem Statement
I begin by delineating the focus of the paper more precisely. I will work with a family of
first-order multi-modal logics in this paper. The generalization from intuitionistic logic re-
flects the utility of more general ways of structuring logical specifications [Baldoni et al., 1993,
Baldoni et al., 1998a], as well as the broader importance of expressive modality in practical knowl-
edge representation [McCarthy, 1993, McCarthy, 1997]. Qualitatively, what distinguishes the
logics I consider (for which formal definitions are provided in Section 2) is that they permit
rules of modal inference to be formulated in two equivalent ways [Fitting, 1972, Fitting, 1983,
Wallen, 1990]. I illustrate the alternatives for the case of S4, a logic that we can perhaps regard as
the pure modal logic of local and global modular assumptions [Giordano and Martelli, 1994].
1.1.1 Structural scope and modularity
The first formulation of modal inference is illustrated by the sequent inference figure below:
Γ∗ → G,∆∗
Γ → ✷G,∆ (→ ✷)
Such inferences set up a discipline of structural scope in proofs. Read upward, as a description of
proof search, the figure describes how to accomplish generic reasoning about a modal context, such
as the conclusion ✷G here. We have to transform the sequent we are considering, by restricting
our attention just to the generic modal statements in the sequent. Specifically, Γ∗ contains the
formula occurrences of the form ✷A in Γ, and ∆∗ contains the formula occurrences of the form
✸A in ∆. The effect of the transformation is that we move from our current scope into a new,
nested scope in which just generic information is available. Figure 1 illustrates all the structurally-
scoped S4 sequent inferences that I will draw on in this motivating discussion; I refer the reader to
[Fitting, 1983, Wallen, 1990] for more details on structurally-scoped proof.
The ability to define structural scope is intimately connected with the ability to describe mod-
ular and local reasoning. In specifying reasoning, we can think of antecedent formulas in sequents
as program statements and succedent formulas in sequents as goals. In modal logics with structural
scope, a necessary goal✷G can be seen as a modular goal because, as enforced by the structurally-
scoped inference figure, only program statements of the form ✷P can contribute to its proof. In
other words, we cannot use the entire program to prove G; rather, we must use a designated part of
the program: formulas of the form ✷P. This is the module we use to prove G. Multi-modal logic
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Γ∗ → G,∆∗
Γ → ✷G,∆ (→ ✷)
Γ,G → ∆
Γ,✷G → ∆ (✷→)
Γ,P → G,∆
Γ → P ⊃ G,∆ (→⊃)
Γ → G,∆ Γ,P → ∆
Γ,G ⊃ P → ∆ (⊃→)
Γ,A → ∆ Γ,B → ∆
Γ,A∨B → ∆ (∨→)
Γ → A,∆ Γ → B,∆
Γ → A∧B,∆ (→∧)
Γ,A → A,∆ (Axiom)
Figure 1: Six inference figures and the axiom for structurally-scoped S4. After [Fitting, 1983,
Wallen, 1990]. Sequents are multisets of modal formulas; this formulation (though not others that
we will consider later) requires a structural rule of contraction. See Section 2.
allows us to name modules in a general way [Baldoni et al., 1993, Baldoni et al., 1998a].
In fragments of logic without the operator ✸, including S4 translations of intuitionistic formu-
las in particular, modularity brings locality. A goal ✷(P ⊃ G) introduces a local assumption P.
The assumption is local in the sense that it can only contribute to the proof of G, and cannot con-
tribute to any other goal. We can motivate this locality in logical terms by examining the sequent
inferences for (→ ✷) and (→⊃) in combination:
Γ∗,P ✲ G
Γ∗ ✲ P ⊃ G (→⊃)
Γ ✲ ✷(P ⊃ G),∆ (→ ✷)
Observe that this logical fragment is constructed so that the succedent context ∆∗ above (→ ✷) is
empty, and so we introduce P into a subproof where G is the only goal.
Logical modularity and locality underlie the use of the proof theory of modal logic as
a declarative framework for structuring specifications, and thereby facilitating their design
and reuse [Miller, 1989, Giordano and Martelli, 1994, Baldoni et al., 1993, Baldoni et al., 1996,
Baldoni et al., 1998a].2 Concretely, a goal that specifies the part of the program to be used in
its proof will give rise to the same operational behavior when other parts of the program change.
In this paper, I further emphasize that logical modularity and locality provide declarative tools for
constraining the complexity of proof search itself. My motivating example is the proof in Figure 2,
2 The model theory of modal logic can also be used to structure specifications [Sakakibara, 1987].
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A, . . . ✲ A
B, . . . ✲ B,A A, . . . ✲ A
B,B ⊃ A, . . . ✲ A (⊃→)
B,✷(B ⊃ A), . . . ✲ A (✷→)
A∨B,✷(B⊃ A), . . . ✲ A (∨→)
✷(A∨B),✷(B ⊃ A), . . . ✲ A (✷→)
✷(A∨B),✷(B ⊃ A), . . . ✲ ✷A (→ ✷)
C, . . . ✲ C
D, . . . ✲ D,C C, . . . ✲ C
D,D ⊃C, . . . ✲ C (⊃→)
D,✷(D ⊃C), . . . ✲ C (✷→)
C∨D,✷(D ⊃C), . . . ✲ C (∨→)
✷(C∨D),✷(D ⊃C), . . . ✲ C (✷→)
✷(C∨D),✷(D ⊃C), . . . ✲ ✷C (→✷)
✷(A∨B),✷(C∨D),✷(B ⊃ A),✷(D ⊃C) ✲ (✷A)∧ (✷C) (→∧)
Figure 2: This structurally-scoped S4 proof shows how the locality of modular assumptions lim-
its the possible interactions in proof. Ellipses mark points in sequents where I have suppressed
additional formula occurrences that no longer contribute to the inference.
which establishes that the conclusion
(✷A)∧ (✷C)
follows from the assumptions
✷(A∨B),✷(C∨D),✷(B ⊃ A),✷(D ⊃C)
The assumptions in this proof—the program statements—specify two ambiguities. Either A or
B holds, and either C or D holds. As part of the specification, we use modal operators to say how to
reason with these ambiguities: we have ✷(A∨B) and ✷(C∨D). This means that the ambiguities
themselves are generic; we can use them to perform case analysis at any time. However, when we
reason about any particular case, we make local assumptions—we will assume A rather than ✷A
for example.
This specification limits the way case analyses in the proof interact. Consider our goal here:
(✷A)∧ (✷C). We must prove each conjunct separately, using generic information; that is, each
conjunct is proved in its own new nested scope. Thus, in the proof of Figure 2, we perform case
analysis from ✷(A∨B) within the nested scope for ✷A, and perform case analysis from ✷(C∨D)
within the nested scope for ✷C. Observe that the logic dictates the choice for us. For instance,
performing case analysis from✷(A∨B) within the nested scope for✷C is useless—the assumption
of A and B cannot help here. Importantly, performing case analysis from ✷(A∨B) at the initial,
outermost scope is also useless. Whatever assumptions we make will have to be discarded when
we try to prove the conjuncts, and consider only generic information. This specification therefore
cordons off the two ambiguities from one another in this proof problem. We have to consider the
ambiguities separately.
Effectively, it is part of the meaning of the specification of Figure 2 that proofs must be short.
A proof in this specification must be a combined record of independent steps, not an interacting
record with combined resolutions of ambiguities. To my knowledge, the possibility for this kind of
declarative search control in disjunctive modal specifications has not received comment previously.
But it seems to me to be one of the most exciting and unique uses for modal logic in representation
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Γ → Gµα,∆
Γ → ✷Gµ,∆ (→✷)
Γ,Gµν → ∆
Γ,✷Gµ → ∆ (✷→)
Γ,Pµ → Gµ,∆
Γ → P ⊃ Gµ,∆ (→⊃)
Γ → Gµ,∆ Γ,Pµ → ∆
Γ,G ⊃ Pµ → ∆ (⊃→)
Γ,Aµ → ∆ Γ,Bµ → ∆
Γ,A∨Bµ → ∆ (∨→)
Γ → Aµ,∆ Γ → Bµ,∆
Γ → A∧Bµ,∆ (→∧)
Γ,Aµ → Aµ,∆ (Axiom)
Figure 3: Six inference figures and the axiom for explicitly-scoped S4. See [Fitting, 1983,
Wallen, 1990, Stone, 1999]. The (→ ✷) inference is subject to an eigenvariable condition that
α is new. In the (✷→) inference, µν refers to any sequence of terms that extends µ by a suffix ν.
and problem-solving.
1.1.2 Explicit scope and goal-directed search
The second formulation of modal reasoning is illustrated by the sequent figure below:
Γ ✲ Gµα,∆
Γ ✲ ✷Gµ,∆ (→ ✷)
Such inferences institute an explicitly-scoped sequent calculus; each formula is tagged with a la-
bel indicating the modal context which it describes. These labels are sequences of terms, each of
which corresponds to an inference that changes scope. Superscripts are my notation for labels;
above, µ labels the scope of the succedent formula ✷G. To reason about a generic modal formula,
we again introduce a new, nested scope in which just generic information is available; we now
label the formula with its new scope. Thus above G is labeled µα; and α is subject to an eigenvari-
able condition—it cannot occur elsewhere in the sequent—and so represents a generic possibility.
At axioms, the scopes of premises and conclusions must match; therefore modal inferences can
dispense with destructive transformation of sequents.
Figure 3 illustrates the other explicitly-scoped S4 sequent inferences that I will draw on
in this motivating discussion. Explicitly-scoped proof systems have a long history as prefixed
tableaus; see [Fitting, 1983, Wallen, 1990] and references therein. Each label sequence can
be viewed as representing a possible world in possible-worlds semantics, so for example the
(→ ✷) inference figure represents a transition from the world named by µ to a new world µα
that represents a generic possibility accessible from µ. The more general study of such sys-
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tems has put them in a new proof-theoretic perspective recently. They are closely related to
semantics-based translation systems [Ohlbach, 1991, Nonnengart, 1993] and labelled deductive
systems [Gabbay, 1996, Basin et al., 1998]. I use the term explicitly-scoped from [Stone, 1999]
because I continue to emphasize the extent to which the two formulations of reasoning represent
the same inferences, just in different ways.
The ability to define explicit scope is intimately connected with the ability to carry out goal-
directed proof. I adopt the perspective due to [Miller et al., 1991] that goal-directed proof simply
amounts to a specific strategy for constructing sequent calculus deductions. The strategy is first
to apply inferences that decompose goals to atoms and then to apply inferences that use a specific
program statement to match a specific goal. Proofs that respect this strategy are called uniform.
On this strategy, logical connectives amount to explicit instructions for search, and this is in fact
what lets us view a logical formula concretely as a program [Miller et al., 1991].
Unlike other, more procedural characterizations of algorithmic proof, such as [Gabbay, 1992],
this view largely abstracts away from the exact state of computations during search. The key
questions are purely proof-theoretic. In particular, goal-directed proof is possible in a logic if and
only if any theorem has a uniform proof. In systems of structural scope, this is not possible, and we
must instead restrict our to inference in specific logical fragments, as described for the intuitionistic
case in, e.g., [Miller et al., 1991, Harland, 1994, Harland et al., 2000].3
By contrast, systems of explicit scope can be lifted by a suitable analogue to the Herbrand-
Skolem-Go¨del theorem for classical logic so that any pair of unrelated inferences can be in-
terchanged [Kleene, 1951, Wallen, 1990, Lincoln and Shankar, 1994, Stone, 1999]. Thus, unlike
systems of structural scope, systems of explicit scope permit general goal-directed reasoning.
If we adopt Miller’s characterization of uniform proof for sequent calculi with multiple con-
clusions [Miller, 1994, Miller, 1996], then any modal theorem has a uniform proof in a lifted,
explicitly-scoped inference system. Put another way, explicitly-scoped inference assimilates modal
proof to classical proof, and we know that uniformity is not really a restriction on classical
proof [Harland, 1997, Nadathur, 1998]. This is why my investigation emphasizes questions of
information-flow, such as modularity and locality, rather than questions of goal-directed proof per
se.
I will refer to the proof of Figure 4 to illustrate some of the properties of information-flow in
goal-directed search. The proof establishes the conclusion
F
from assumptions
A∨B,C∨D,A ⊃ F,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F
First we must get clear on the reasoning Figure 4 represents. The assumptions in this proof
again specify two ambiguities, A∨ B and C ∨D. In modal terms, these are local ambiguities
3 A further case of structural control of inference that has attracted particular interest is linear logic,
where linear disjunction must be understood to specify synchronization between concurrent processes rather than
proof by case analysis; see, e.g., [Andreoli, 1992, Hodas and Miller, 1994, Pym and Harland, 1994, Miller, 1996,
Kobayashi et al., 1999]. The investigation of fragments of linear logic remains essential, as linear logic has no ana-
logue of an explicitly-scoped proof system, and so—unlike intuitionistic logic and modal logic—must be understood
as a refinement of classical logic rather than an extension to it [Girard, 1993].
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3
B, . . . ✲ . . . ,B D, . . . ✲ . . . ,D
B,D, . . . ✲ B∧D (→∧) F , . . . ✲ . . . ,F
B,D,(B∧D)⊃ F, . . . ✲ . . . ,F (⊃→)
2
C, . . . ✲ . . . ,C 3
B,C∨D,(B∧D)⊃ F, . . . ✲ . . . ,C,F (∨→) F, . . . ✲ . . . ,F
B,C∨D,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F ✲ . . . ,F (⊃→)
1
A, . . . ✲ A,F 2
A∨B,C∨D,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F ✲ A,F (∨→) F, . . . ✲ F
A∨B,C∨D,A ⊃ F,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F ✲ F (⊃→)
Figure 4: A goal-directed proof in which multiple cases are considered. Each case is displayed in
a separate block.
that introduce local assumptions; but actually, Figure 4 uses only classical connectives, and this
classical reasoning suffices for my discussion here. In Figure 4, the two ambiguities interact to
require inference for three separate cases: one case where A is true, one case where C is true, and
a final case where B and D are true together. (These cases are laid out separately in Figure 4.)
In goal-directed inference, we discover these cases by backward chaining from the main goal F
through a series of implications: A ⊃ F , C ⊃ F , and (B∧D)⊃ F .
Now we can describe the structure of the proof of Figure 4 more precisely. The inference is
segmented out into three chunks, one for each case. The chunks are indexed to indicate how they
should be assembled into a single proof-tree; the chunk indexed 3 should appear as a subtree
where the index 3 is used in chunk 2 , and that chunk should in turn appear as a subtree where
the index 2 is used in chunk 1 . We could imagine writing out that tree in full—on an ample
blackboard! However, the chunks are actually natural units of the proof of Figure 4; they are what
Loveland calls blocks [Loveland, 1991, Nadathur and Loveland, 1995]. In general, a block of a
derivation is a maximal tree of contiguous inferences in which the right subtree of any (∨ →)
inference in the block is omitted. (Check this in Figure 4.) Each block presents reasoning that
describes a single case from the specification.
Within blocks, we can trace the progress of goal-directed reasoning, as follows. At each step,
our attention is directed to a distinguished goal formula—the current goal—and at most one distin-
guished program formula—the selected statement. For illustration, these distinguished formulas
are underlined in each sequent in Figure 4. Logical operations apply only to distinguished for-
mulas; we first decompose the goal down to atomic formulas, then select a program formula and
reason from it to establish the current goal.
There are two things to notice about this derivation. First, we use a restart discipline when
handling disjunctive case analysis across blocks [Loveland, 1991, Nadathur and Loveland, 1995].
In each new block, the current goal is reset to the original goal F to restart proof search. It is easy
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to see that it does not suffice, in general, to keep the current goal across blocks; in Figure 4, for
example, keeping the current goal would mean continuing to try to prove A after we turn from the
case of A to the case of B. The more general restart rule is however complete; in fact, the restart
rule is a powerful way to extend a goal-directed proof system to logics where a single proof must
sometimes analyze the same goal formula in qualitatively different ways [Gabbay and Reyle, 1984,
Gabbay, 1985, Gabbay, 1992].
Second, note when and how newly-assumed disjuncts are used in new blocks. For exam-
ple, B is assumed in block 2 but it is not used until block 3 . By contrast, D is assumed in
block 3 and used immediately there. Following [Loveland, 1991], I will refer to any use of
a disjunctive premise in the first block of case analysis where it is assumed as a cancellation;
I will also say that the inference that introduces the disjunct, and the new block it creates, are
canceled. The proof of Figure 4 cannot be recast in terms of canceled inferences using the se-
quent rules of Figure 3. Whichever case of A∨B or C∨D is treated first cannot be canceled; the
second disjunct of the one must wait to be used until the second disjunct of the other is intro-
duced. This is a gap between Loveland’s original Near-Horn Prolog interpreter [Loveland, 1991],
which requires cancellations, and the generalized reformulation in terms of sequent calculi given
in [Nadathur and Loveland, 1995, Nadathur, 1998] and suggested in Figure 4. Loveland suggests
that cancellation is just an optimization, but we shall see that modal logic establishes an important
proof-theoretic link between cancellation and modularity.
1.1.3 On modular goal-directed proof search
As befits alternative proof methods for the same logic, structurally-scoped systems and explicitly-
scoped systems are very close. In fact, in the case of intuitionistic logic, they define not just the
same theorems but the same proofs [Stone, 1999]. This correspondence suggests that we use in-
sights about information-flow in structurally-scoped proofs—including the modularity and locality
exhibited by Figure 2—to restrict goal-directed proof-search in explicitly-scoped systems.
In fact, we know from [Stone, 1999] that we can sometimes enforce a straightforward require-
ment of locality in explicitly-scoped inferences, as follows. Assume that we have an explicitly-
scoped proof system for a logic with modularity and locality, with an eigenvariable condition on
(→✷), and we work in a fragment of logic without negation (this again includes the S4 translation
of intuitionistic formulas). Then when we consider a sequent of this form in proof-search:
Γ ✲ ∆
we apply inferences to a formula P in Γ only when P is labeled with a prefix of a label of a formula
in ∆. That is, we can consider inferences on Pµ ∈ Γ only when there is some Gµν ∈ ∆. The prefix
relationship is required for P to eventually contribute to the proof of any ∆ formula. For example
here:
A,Bβ,Cγ,Dδ ✲ Eβ,Fγ
We can consider A, Bβ or Cγ, but not Dδ.
This invariant is weaker than one might want or expect for certain kinds of goal-directed search.
Specifically, we have seen that when we use goal-directed search as a model for logic program-
ming, we understand the interpreter to be working on at most one goal and one program statement
at a time. In this setting, we would like to require that the program statement must be able to
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contribute to the current goal. However, we must understand the result of [Stone, 1999] to require
only that the current program statement must contribute to some goal, not necessarily the current
one. In addition, we must take into account other, inactive goals, such as the goals that we may
potentially restart later in proof search. In the preceding example, even if Eβ were the current goal,
we might have to consider reasoning with Cγ because of the possibility of a restart with Fγ.
For most inferences, we can rule out their contribution to inactive goals, on independent
grounds. Most inferences from assumptions in goal-directed proofs must contribute to the cur-
rent goal or not at all. But there is one difficult case, which happens also the most meaningful one.
This is the case of disjunction itself, where only one disjunct contributes to the current goal. The
other disjunct may contribute to some other goal; we will set up a new proof problem by assuming
this disjunct and making some inactive goal active. Modularity and locality suggest that we should
be able now to select a goal that our newly-assumed disjunct could contribute to. In other words,
if the new disjunct is Pµ the next goal should take the form Gµν with µ a prefix of µν. Call this a
modular restart. The alternative is that there is no relationship of scope between the new disjunct
and the next goal.
Modular restarts would be quite powerful. For example, they would allow us to capture the
declarative search control illustrated in Figure 2. In an explicitly-scoped goal-directed proof cor-
responding to Figure 2, the case analysis for ✷(A∨B) will look like this:
Aα, . . . ✲ Aα, . . . Bα, . . . ✲ Aα, . . .
A∨Bα, . . . ✲ Aα, . . . ∨→
✷(A∨B), . . . ✲ Aα, . . . ✷→
With modular restarts, we know we must continue to take Aα as the current goal in the right top
(Bα) subproof. In effect, we know to build a short proof in which ambiguities are considered
independently. We can cut down the space for proof search accordingly—for example, there will
be no question of introducing the other ambiguity from ✷(C∨D) in the new modular block. On
the other hand, without modular restarts, we are free to reconsider the initial goal (✷A)∧ (✷C)
at this stage; in subsequent search we will reconsider both ✷(A∨B) and ✷(C∨D). Thus, even
though the logic guarantees that ambiguities do not interact in a proof, we still wind up considering
interacting ambiguities in proof search.
The main result of this paper is to provide an explicitly-scoped goal-directed proof system in
which modular restarts are complete. The proof system has modular restarts because, in the new
proof system, any proof can be presented in such a way that all disjunctions are canceled. Each
new disjunct Pµ therefore contributes to the proof of the restart goal in the current block, and so
we know to choose a restart goal Gµν that the new disjunct could contribute to.
It turns out that modular restarts are not automatic; you need to design the policy for disjunctive
inference to respect it. Figure 4 already makes the problem clear. How can we enforce cancella-
tions here? The sequent rules seem not to allow it. The new idea is simple actually—to allow a
new inference figure for disjunction that considers disjuncts out of their textual order:
Γ,Dµ ✲ ∆ Γ,Cµ ✲ ∆
Γ,C∨Dµ ✲ ∆ ∨→ ∗
This is the direct analogue of the Near-Horn Prolog inference scheme, which can proceed by
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2′
C, . . . ✲ . . . ,C F , . . . ✲ . . . ,F
B,C,C ⊃ F , . . . ✲ . . . ,F (⊃→)
3′
B, . . . ✲ . . . ,B
D, . . . ✲ . . . ,D 2′
B,C∨D,C ⊃ F, . . . ✲ . . . ,D (∨→ ∗)
B,C∨D,C ⊃ F, . . . ✲ B∧D (→∧) F, . . . ✲ . . . ,F
B,C∨D,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F, . . . ✲ . . . ,F (⊃→)
1
A, . . . ✲ A,F 3′
A∨B,C∨D,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F ✲ A,F (∨→) F , . . . ✲ F
A∨B,C∨D,A ⊃ F ,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F ✲ F (⊃→)
Figure 5: A reanalysis of the proof of Figure 4 to enforce cancellations. We rewrite block 3′ , in
which B is canceled, to use the new disjunctive inference figure; block 3′ thus becomes the second
block after 1 . At the same time, we introduce a simplified block 2′ which uses the assumption
C, without disjunction at all.
matching any of the heads of a disjunctive clause at any time [Loveland, 1991]. The new sequent
rule will allow us to reanalyze the constitution of higher blocks so that, wherever we use the new
disjunct in the original proof, we can always reanalyze it as part of the current block. Figure 5
demonstrates this reanalysis for Figure 4. In fact, demonstrating the generality of such reanalysis
will prove to be quite involved. Explicitly-scoped inferences with an eigenvariable condition give
blocks in modal proofs an inherently hierarchical structure, because of the different modal scopes
that are introduced and the local assumptions that are made. Loveland’s construction for cancel-
lations, by contrast, assumes that the structure of blocks is flat. Instead, we must use the natural
tools of the sequent calculus to develop suitable constructions for reanalyzed inferences.
1.2 The results and their context
The problem sketched in Section 1.1 is a pure problem of modal proof. Accordingly, all the proof
systems I consider will describe sound and complete inference under the usual Kripke semantics
for modal logic [Kripke, 1963, Fitting, 1983]. I will not consider interactions of disjunction with
negation-by-failure and other operational features of of logic programming proof-search systems.
For such issues in disjunctive logic programming, see for example [Lobo et al., 1992]. Nor will I
attempt to describe a minimal model or fixed-point construction in which exactly the consequences
of a modal program hold, as in [Orgun and Wadge, 1992].
Moreover, my interest is in specific fragments of specific modal logics in particular. Modularity
and locality allow consideration of the logics T, K and K4 in addition to S4, but are not compatible
with such logics as S5, temporal logics with symmetric past and future operators [Gabbay, 1987],
the logic of context of [McCarthy and Buvacˇ, 1994] or the modal logic of named addresses of
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[Kobayashi et al., 1999]. For example, in S5, if ✷A is true at any world, then ✷A is true at all
worlds; thus the logic prohibits making such an assumption locally. To see the problem, observe,
for example, that ✷(✷A ⊃ B)∨✷A is a theorem of S5. Modal proofs in such cases require global
restarts [Gabbay and Olivetti, 1998]. Locality further rules out logical fragments with possibility
or negation. Such fragments can be used to pose goals about that access otherwise local assump-
tions, as in the theorem ✷(A ⊃ B)∨✸A of all normal modal logics. (Goal-directed proof of this
theorem also involves a global restart.) Moreover, such fragments make it more difficult to enforce
modularity as well, since they do not permit an eigenvariable condition at (→ ✷) inferences in
goal-directed proofs. My investigation therefore sticks closely to the treatments of logical mod-
ularity and locality originally explored in [Miller, 1989, Giordano and Martelli, 1994]. Indeed, I
continue to restrict implications and universal quantifiers in goals to strict statements of the form
✷(P ⊃ G) and ✷∀xG.
The basic strategy that I adopt is to start with a relatively straightforward proof system, and
gradually to narrow the formulation of its inference rules—preserving soundness and complete-
ness with respect to the underlying semantics—until we have a proof system, SCLP, with the
desired characteristics, namely goal-directed search and modular restarts. I have been particularly
influenced by Lincoln and Shankar’s presentation of proof-theoretic results in terms of simple
transformations among successive proof systems [Lincoln and Shankar, 1994]; and by Andreoli’s
construction of focusing sequent calculi that embody the discipline of goal-directed proof directly
in the form of inference figures [Andreoli, 1992].
However, the correct design of the final proof system requires a variety of proof-theoretic ideas
about logic programming to be extended, strengthened, and combined with proof-theoretic results
about modal logic in a novel way. To describe logic programming, we start with the idea of
uniform proof search described in [Miller et al., 1991] and extended to multiple-conclusion calculi
in [Miller, 1994]. To derive a uniform proof system in the presence of indefinite information in
assumptions, however, we can no longer use the familiar quantifier rules used in previous logic
programming research, which simply introduce fresh parameters; we must apply a generalization
of Herbrand’s Theorem [Lincoln and Shankar, 1994] and work with quantifier rules that introduce
structured terms. The calculus of Herbrand terms, SCL, lifts the explicitly-scoped proof systems
considered in Section 1.1.2 and [Fitting, 1983, Wallen, 1990]. The key property of SCL is that
inferences can be freely interchanged. This allows arbitrary proofs to be transformed easily into
uniform proofs.
The modular behavior of this uniform system depends on the further proof-theoretic analyses
of path-based sequent calculi adapted, in part, from [Stone, 1999]. These analyses establish that
path representations enforce modularity and locality in the uses of formulas in proofs, even with
otherwise classical reasoning. Hence, although path-based calculi obscure the natural modularity
of modal inference, they do not eliminate it. I finish with a streamlined uniform proof system that
takes advantage of these results; as a consequence, proof search in this calculus can dynamically
exploit the local use of modular assumptions.
The justification of this new proof system makes much of a strategy originally due to
[Kleene, 1951], in which the inferences in a proof are reordered so as to satisfy a global invari-
ant. The strategy achieves termination despite generous copying and deepening of inferences by a
judicious choice of transformations within a double induction. In our cases, these transformations
are guided by the constraints of uniform proof, and by the cancellations of disjunctive assumptions
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that we know we must maintain in proofs, to achieve modularity. This provides an analogue of
Loveland’s transformations on restart proofs [Loveland, 1991] in the sequent calculus setting.
Of course, modal logic is not just a modular logic. Modal logic provides a general, declar-
ative formalism for specifying change over time, the knowledge of agents, and other special-
purpose domains [Prior, 1967, Hintikka, 1971, Schild, 1991]. Goal-directed systems for modal
proof are often motivated by such specifications [Farin˜as del Cerro, 1986, Debart et al., 1992,
Baldoni et al., 1993, Baldoni et al., 1996]. In generalizing goal-directed modal proof to indefi-
nite specifications, SCLP can play an important role in applying modal formalisms to planning,
information-gathering and communication [Stone, 1998a, Stone, 2000]. Even when content, not
modularity, is primary, the modular treatment of disjunction limits the size of proofs and the kinds
of interactions that must be considered in proof search. Such constraints are crucial to the use
of logical techniques in applications that require automatic assessment of incomplete information,
such as planning and natural language generation. The interest of these more general applications
helps explain why I pursue this investigation in the full first-order language.
1.3 Outline
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. I begin by presenting first-order multi-modal
logic in Section 2. I consider syntax (Section 2.1), semantics (Section 2.2), and finally proof
(Section 2.3); I describe the explicitly-scoped Herbrand proof system for modal logic that is my
starting point. Section 2.4 shows that this calculus offers a suitable framework for goal-directed
proof because uniform proof search in this calculus is complete.
Section 3 describes and justifies a modular goal-directed proof system, as advertised in Sec-
tion 1.1. I introduce the calculus itself in Section 3.1, along with key definitions and examples.
Then in Sections 3.2–3.4 I outline how this sequent calculus is derived in stages from the calculus
of Section 2. Full details are provided in an appendix.
Finally, Section 4 offers a broader assessment of these results. I consider some further opti-
mizations that the new sequent calculus invites in Section 4.1, and briefly conclude in Section 4.2
with some applications of first-order multi-modal inference that the new sequent calculus suggests.
2 First-order multi-modal deduction
I begin by supporting the informal presentation of first-order multi-modal logic from Section 1
more explicitly. I will adopt a number of techniques that are individually quite familiar. I allow an
arbitrary number of modal operators and a flexible regime for relating different modal operators
to one another, following many applied investigations [Debart et al., 1992, Baldoni et al., 1993,
Baldoni et al., 1996, Baldoni et al., 1998b]. I use prefix terms for worlds and sequent calcu-
lus inference, following the comprehensive treatment of the first-order modal logic using pre-
fix terms and analytic tableaux (or, seen upside-down, in the cut-free sequent calculus) of
[Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998]. I factor out reasoning about accessibility into side conditions
on inference rules, similar to the proof-theoretic view of [Basin et al., 1998], in which reasoning
about accessibility and boolean reasoning are clearly distinguished. And I use Herbrand terms
to reason correctly about parameterized instances of formulas, avoiding the usual eigenvariable
condition on quantifier (and modal) rules, as in [Lincoln and Shankar, 1994].
Though the techniques are routine, the combination is still somewhat unusual. Re-
search in modal logic—whether the investigation is more mathematical [Gore´, 1992,
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Massacci, 1998b, Massacci, 1998a, Gore´, 1999] or primarily concerns algorithms for proof
search [Otten and Kreitz, 1996, Beckert and Gore´, 1997, Schmidt, 1998]—is dominated by the
study of the propositional logic of a single modal operator (or accessibility relation). More-
over, researchers who have investigated modal logic in a first-order setting have tended
to jump directly into a discussion of particular theorem-proving strategies, particularly
resolution [Jackson and Reichgelt, 1987, Wallen, 1990, Catach, 1991, Frisch and Scherl, 1991,
Auffray and Enjalbert, 1992, Nonnengart, 1993, Ohlbach, 1993].
2.1 Syntax
Our language depends on a signature including a suitable set of atomic constants C (and suitable
predicate symbols and modalities). We then consider program statements of the syntactic category
D(C) and goals of the category G(C) defined recursively as in (1); we refer to the union of these
two languages as L(C). (1) makes explicit the conditions observed in Section 1.2; there is no
possibility or negation, and universal and hypothetical goals must be modal.
(1) G ::= A | [M]G | G∧G | G∨G | [M](∀xG) | ∃xG | [M](D ⊃ G)
D ::= A | [M]D | D∧D | D∨D | ∀xD | ∃xD | G ⊃ D
In (1), A schematizes an atomic formula; atomic formulas take the form pi(a1, . . . ,ak) where pi is
a predicate symbol of arity k and each ai is either a variable or an atomic constant in the set C.
We assume some initial non-empty set of constants CONST . But it will be convenient to consider
languages in which a countably infinite number of parameters are included in the language to
supplement the symbols in CONST.
In (1), [M] schematizes a modal operator of necessity; intuitively, such modal operators allow
a specification to manipulate constrained sources of information. That is, a program statement
[M]D explicitly indicates that D holds in the constrained source of information associated with
the operator [M]. Conversely, a goal [M]G can be satisfied only when G is established by using
information from the constrained source associated with [M].
We will work in a multi-modal logic, in which any finite number m of distinct necessity op-
erators or modalities may be admitted. (Necessity operators will also be written as ✷ or ✷i.) In
addition to ordinary program statements, a specification may contain any of the following axiom
schemes describing the modalities to be used in program statements and goals:
(2) ✷i p ⊃ p veridicality (VER)
✷i p ⊃ ✷i✷i p positive introspection (PI)
✷i p ⊃ ✷ j p inclusion (INC)
These axioms describe the nature of the information that an operator provides, and spell out re-
lationships among the different sources of information in a specification. (VER) is needed for
information that correctly reflects the world; (PI), for information that provides a complete picture
of how things might be; and (INC), for a source of information, j, that elaborates on information
from another source, i. Because we use this explicit axiomatization, we can take the names of the
modal operators as arbitrary.
We appeal to the usual notions of free and bound occurrences of variables in formulas; we
likewise invoke the depth of a formula—the largest number of nested logical connectives in it.
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2.2 Semantics
As is standard, we describe the models for the modal language in two steps. The first step is to set
up frames that describe the structure of any model; a full model can then be obtained by combining
a frame with a way of assigning interpretations to formulas in a frame.
Definition 1 (Frame) A frame consists of a tuple 〈w,R ,D〉 where: w is a non-empty set of pos-
sible worlds; R names a family of m binary accessibility relations on w, a relation R i for each
modality i; and D is a domain function mapping members of w to non-empty sets.
Within the frame F , the function D induces a set D(F ), called the domain of the frame, as
∪{D(w) | w ∈ w}. In order to simplify the treatment of constant symbols, it is also convenient to
define a set of objects that all the domains of the different possible worlds have in common, the
common domain of the frame F : C (F ) = ∩{D(w) | w ∈ w}. We effectively insist that C (F ) be
non-empty as well, since CONST is non-empty and each symbol in CONST must be interpreted
by an element of C (F ).
The intermediate level of frames is useful in characterizing the meanings of modal operators
and modal quantification. In particular, simply by putting constraints on R i or on D at the level
of frames, we can obtain representative classes of models in which certain general patterns of
inference are validated. The constraints we will avail ourselves of are introduced in Definition 2.
Definition 2 Let 〈w,R ,D〉 be a frame. We say the frame is:
• reflexive at i if wR iw′ for every w ∈ w;
• transitive at i if, for any w,w′′ ∈ w, wR iw′′ whenever there is a w′ ∈w such that wR iw′ and
w′R iw
′′;
• narrowing from i to j if wR jw′ implies wR iw′ for all w,w′ ∈ w;
• increasing domain if for all w,w′ ∈ w, D(w) ⊆ D(w′) whenever there is some accessibility
relationship wR iw′.
Our scheme for using the constraints of Definition 2 depends on establishing a regime for the m
modalities in the language, describing the inferences that should relate them. The regime is defined
as follows.
Definition 3 (Regime) A regime is a tuple 〈A ,N ,Q 〉, where: A is a function mapping each
modality into one of the symbols K, K4, T and S4; N is a (strict) partial order on the modali-
ties; and Q is the symbol increasing.
The reader will recognize the symbols in the image of A as the classic names for modal logics
of a single modality. S4 is for modalities that are subject to (PI) and (VER). T is for modalities
that are subject just to (VER). K4 is for modalities that are subject just to (PI). K is modalities
subject to neither axiom. The interactions specified by (INC) are determined by the partial order on
modalities: j≤ i when✷i p⊃✷ j p. This meaning for these symbols can be enforced by considering
only frames that respect the given regime.
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Definition 4 (Respect) Let F = 〈w,R ,D〉 be a frame, and let S = 〈A ,N ,Q 〉 be a regime. We
say F respects S whenever the following conditions are met for all modalities i and j:
• If A(i) is T or S4 then R i is reflexive.
• If A(i) is K4 or S4 then R i is transitive.
• If j ≤ i according to N then F is narrowing from i to j.
• If Q is increasing, then F is increasing domain.
From now on, we assume that some regime S = 〈A ,N ,Q 〉 is fixed, and restrict our attention to
frames that respect S . Informally, now, a model consists of a frame together with an interpretation.
Definition 5 (Interpretation) J is an interpretation in a frame 〈w,R ,D〉 if J satisfies these two
conditions:
1. J assigns to each n-place relation symbol pi and each possible world w ∈ w some n-ary
relation on the domain of the frame D(F ).
2. J assigns to each constant symbol c some element of the common domain of the frame C (F ).
Thus we can define a model over S thus:
Definition 6 (Model) A first-order k-modal model over a regime S is a tuple 〈w,R ,D,J 〉 where
〈w,R ,D〉 is a frame that respects S and J is an interpretation in 〈w,R ,D〉.
To define truth in a model, we need the usual notion of assignments and variants:
Definition 7 (Assignment) Let M = 〈w,R ,D,J 〉 be a model (that respects the regime S ). An
assignment in M is a mapping g that assigns to each variable x some member g(x) of the domain
of the frame of the model D(〈w,R ,D〉).
In proofs, we interpret formulas not just in the ordinary language L(C) with a given set of modali-
ties, relations, constants and variables, but in an expanded language L(C∪P) which also includes
a set P of first-order parameters; we will want to use the same models for this interpretation. Over
L(C∪P), we suppose that an assignment in M also assigns some member g(p) of the domain of
the frame of M to each parameter p in P.
Definition 8 (Variants) Let g and g′ be two assignments in a model M = 〈w,R ,D,J 〉; g′ is
an x-variant of g at a world w ∈ w if g and g′ agree on all variables except possibly for x and
g′(x) ∈ D(w).
Definition 9 (Truth in a model) Let M = 〈w,R ,D,J 〉 be a model. Then the formula A is true at
world w of model M on assignment g—written M ,w −g A—just in case the clause below selected
by syntactic structure of A is satisfied:
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• A is pi(t1, . . . , tn): Then M ,w −g A just in case 〈e1, . . .en〉 ∈ J (pi,w), where for each ti, ei is
J (ti) if ti is a constant and g(ti) otherwise.
• A is B1∧B2: Then M ,w −g A just in case both M ,w −g B1 and M ,w −g B2.
• A is B1∨B2: Then M ,w −g A just in case either M ,w −g B1 or M ,w −g B1.
• A is ✷iB: Then M ,w −g A just in case for every w′ ∈ w, if wR iw′ then M ,w′ −g B.
• A is ∀xB: Then M ,w −g A just in case for every x-variant g′ of g at w, M ,w −g′ B.
• A is ∃xB: Then M ,w −g A just in case there is some x-variant g′ of g at w with M ,w −g′ B.
By a sentence we mean a formula of L(CONST) in which no variables occur free. For any
sentence A, model M and world w of M , a simple induction on depth guarantees that M ,w −g A
for some assignment g in M exactly when M ,w −g A for all assignments g in M . In this case, we
can write simply M ,w − A and say that A is true in M at w.
Definition 10 (Valid) Let A be a sentence and M = 〈w,R ,D,J 〉 be a model. A is valid in M if
for every world w ∈ w, M ,w − A. A is valid (on the regime 〈A ,N ,Q 〉) if A is valid in any model
M that respects the regime.
2.3 Proof theory
We now present our basic deductive system—a cut-free path-based sequent calculus for multi-
modal deduction which uses Herbrand terms to reason correctly about parameterized instances
of formulas. Since this calculus represents our basic lifted sequent calculus for modal logic, we
refer to it as SCL here. Our starting point is Theorem 1 that SCL provides a sound and complete
characterization of valid formulas.
SCL has the advantage that inferences can be freely interchanged, allowing arbitrary proofs to
be transformed easily into goal-directed proofs; we show in Theorem 2, presented in Section 2.4,
how to obtain goal-directed proofs in this calculus. The very same flexibility of inference, however,
means that this calculus neither respects nor represents the potential of modal inference to give
proofs an explicitly modular structure.
The basic constituent in SCL is a tracked, prefixed formula. The formulas extend the basic
languages D(C) and G(C) of definitions and goals defined in (1) by allowing additional terms—
representing arbitrary witnesses of first order quantifiers, and arbitrary transitions of modal ac-
cessibility among possible worlds—to be introduced into formulas for the purposes of proof. We
begin by assuming two countable sets of symbols: a set H of first-order Herbrand functions and
ϒ of modal Herbrand functions. We can now define sets PH of first-order Herbrand terms, κϒ of
modal Herbrand terms, and Π(κϒ) of Herbrand prefixes by mutual recursion:
Definition 11 (Herbrand terms and prefixes) Assume that t0 is a Herbrand prefix and let
t1, . . . , tn be a sequence (possibly empty), where each ti is either an element of C, a first-order Her-
brand term, or a Herbrand prefix. Then if h is a first-order Herbrand function then h(t0, t1, . . . , tn)
is a first-order Herbrand term. If η is a modal Herbrand function then η(t0, t1, . . . , tn) is a modal
Herbrand term. A Herbrand prefix is any finite sequence of modal Herbrand terms.
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The rationale behind the use of a Herbrand term h(X) at an existential inference R goes like this.
At existential inferences, we need to reason about a generic individual. We need to have a suitable
representation for a generic individual for R. Regardless of the order in which inferences are
applied in a sequent deduction, there will be some parameters that must occur in the sequent where
R applies. For example, some parameters must appear here as a result of the instantiations that
must take place in deriving the formula to which R applies. We must be sure that the individual
we introduce for R is different from all these parameters. The terms X which are supplied as
an argument to the Herbrand term h(X) identify these parameters indirectly. The structure h(X)
therefore serves as a placeholder for a new parameter that could be chosen to be different from
each of the terms in X . The structure h(X) thus packs all the information required to allow the
inferences in the proof to be reordered and an appropriate parameter chosen so that the inference
at R is truly generic.
In modal deduction, of course, we need generic individuals at modal inferences as well as
existential ones. Modal Herbrand inference therefore requires that we introduce Herbrand terms
to describe transitions among possible worlds and Herbrand prefixes to name possible worlds, in
addition to introducing first-order Herbrand terms to represent first-order parameters. In this case,
the arguments X to Herbrand terms must mix first-order Herbrand terms and Herbrand prefixes,
since logical formulas can encode dependencies among first-order and modal parameters.
A prefixed formula is now an expression of the form Aµ with A a formula and µ a Herbrand
prefix—we use D(C∪PH)Π(κϒ) and G(C∪PH)Π(κϒ) to refer to prefixed definitions and prefixed
goals. For Herbrand calculi, formulas must also be tracked to indicate the sequence of instantia-
tions that has taken place in the derivation of the formula.
Definition 12 (Tracked expressions) If E denotes the expressions of some class, then the tracked
expressions of that class are expressions of the form eI where e is an expression of E and I is a
finite sequence (possibly empty) of elements of C∪PH ∪Π(κϒ).
We say that a tracked expression eI tracks a term t just in case t occurs as a subterm of some term
in I.
In order to reason correctly about multiple modal operators, we need to keep track of the kinds
of accessibility that any modal transition represents. To endow the system with correct first-order
reasoning on increasing domains, we also need to keep track of the worlds where first-order terms
are introduced. We use the following notation to record these judgments: µ/ν : i indicates that
world ν is accessible from world µ by the accessibility relation for modality i; and t : µ indicates
that the entity associated with term t exists at world µ.
It is convenient to keep track of this information by anticipating the restricted reasoning re-
quired for our fragment L(C) and exploiting the structure of Herbrand terms, as follows. It is
clear that there are countably many first-order Herbrand terms, Herbrand prefixes, and formulas in
L(C∪PH). We can therefore describe a correspondence as follows. If A is a formula of the form
∀xB or ∃xB and u is a natural number, we define a corresponding first-order Herbrand function huA
so that each first-order Herbrand function is hA for some A and no first-order Herbrand function is
huA and hvB for distinct A and B or distinct u and v. Likewise, if A is a formula of the form ✷iB and
u is a natural number, we define a corresponding modal Herbrand function ηuA so that each modal
Herbrand function is ηuA for some A and no modal Herbrand function is ηuA and ηvB for distinct A
and B or distinct u and v. (Indexing Herbrand functions by natural numbers means that adapting a
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Herbrand proof to respect an eigenvariable condition can be as simple as reindexing its Herbrand
functions.) Now we have:
Definition 13 (Herbrand typings) A Herbrand typing for the language L(C∪PH) (under a corre-
spondence as just described) is a set Ξ of statements, each of which takes one of two forms:
1. µ/µη : i where: µ is a Herbrand prefix and η is a modal Herbrand term of the form ηuA(µ, . . .)
and A is ✷iB.
2. t : µ where t is a first-order Herbrand term of the form h(µ, . . .).
A sequence of modal and first-order Herbrand terms X determines a Herbrand typing ΞX , consist-
ing of the appropriate µ/µη : i for each modal Herbrand term η that occurs in X (possibly as a
subterm) and the appropriate h : µ for each first-order Herbrand term h that occurs in X (possibly
as a subterm).
Definition 14 (Typings) Suppose that Ξ is a Herbrand typing over a language L(C∪P)Π(κ), and
that S = 〈A ,N , increasing〉 is a modal regime. We define the relation that E is a derived typ-
ing from Ξ with respect to S , written S ,Ξ ⊲ E, as the smallest relation satisfying the following
conditions:
• (K). S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : i if µ/ν : i ∈ Ξ.
• (T ). S ,Ξ⊲µ/µ : i if A(i) is T or S4, and µ occurs in Ξ.
• (4). S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : i if µ/µ′ : i ∈ Ξ, S ,Ξ⊲µ′/ν : i, and A(i) is K4 or S4.
• (Inc). S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : i if S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : j and j ≤ i according to N .
• (V ). S ,Ξ⊲ t : µ if t : µ ∈ Ξ.
• (I). S ,Ξ⊲ t : ν if S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : i for some i and S ,Ξ⊲ t : µ.
Inspection of these rules shows that S ,Ξ ⊲ µ/ν : i only if ν and µ occur in Ξ. Moreover, given
these rules, an easy induction on the length of typing derivations gives that S ,Ξ ⊲ µ/ν : i only if
ν = µν′ for some prefix ν′. Thus, suppose that S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : i for some Herbrand typing Ξ: each step
in the derivation must concern some prefix of ν and thus S ,Ξν ⊲ µ/ν : i. These invariants permit
some simplifications in reasoning in the fragment L(C∪P) over more expressive modal regimes
containing other modal operators and other uses of connectives.
These definitions allow us to describe the modal Herbrand sequent calculus precisely. This
calculus, SCL, is given in Definition 15. Note that for this fragment of modal logic, it suffices
to consider sequents of the form ∆ ✲ Γ, where ∆ is a multiset of prefixed definitions (from
D(C ∪ PH)Π(κϒ)), and Γ is a multiset of prefixed goals (from G(C ∪ PH)Π(κϒ)). Note also that
S ,Ξ⊲µ/ν : i only if ν is of the form µν′.
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Definition 15 (Herbrand sequent calculus) For basic first-order multi-modal Herbrand deduc-
tions in our fragment over a regime S , we will use the sequent rules defined here, which comprise
the system SCL. The rules consist of an axiom rule and recursive rules—each recursive rule re-
lates a base sequent below to one or more spur sequents above; it applies to the base in virtue of
an occurrence of a distinguished tracked, prefixed formula in the sequent; we refer to this as the
principal expression or simply the principal of the inference. Similarly, each of the sequent rules
introduces new expressions onto each spur, which we refer to as the side expressions of the rule.
We will also refer to the two named expression occurrences at axioms as the principal expressions
or principals of the axiom. Now we have:
1. axiom—A atomic:
∆,AµX ✲ Γ,A
µ
Y
2. conjunctive:
∆,A∧BµX ,A
µ
X ,B
µ
X
✲ Γ
∆,A∧BµX ✲ Γ
(∧→)
∆ ✲ Γ,A∨BµX ,A
µ
X ,B
µ
X
∆ ✲ Γ,A∨BµX
(→∨)
∆,AµX ✲ Γ,A ⊃ B
µ
X ,B
µ
X
∆ ✲ Γ,A ⊃ BµX
(→⊃)
3. disjunctive:
∆ ✲ Γ,A∧BµX ,A
µ
X ∆ ✲ Γ,A∧B
µ
X ,B
µ
X
∆ ✲ Γ,A∧BµX
(→∧)
∆,A∨BµX ,A
µ
X
✲ Γ ∆,A∨BµX ,B
µ
X
✲ Γ
∆,A∨BµX ✲ Γ
(∨→)
∆,A ⊃ BµX ✲ A
µ
X ,Γ ∆,A ⊃ B
µ
X ,B
µ
X
✲ Γ
∆,A ⊃ BµX ✲ Γ
(⊃→)
4. possibility—where η is ηu
✷iA(µ,X) for some u:
∆ ✲ Γ,✷iAµX ,A
µη
X ,µη
∆ ✲ Γ,✷iAµX
(→✷)
5. necessity—subject to the side condition S ,Ξν ⊲µ/µν : i:
∆,✷iAµX ,A
µν
X ,µν
✲ Γ
∆,✷iAµX ✲ Γ
(✷→)
6. existential—subject to the side condition that h is huB(µ,X) for BµX the principal of the rule
(either ∃xA or ∀xA) and some u:
∆,∃xAµ,A[h/x]µX ,h ✲ Γ
∆,∃xAµX ✲ Γ
(∃→)
∆ ✲ Γ,∀xAµX ,A[h/x]
µ
X ,h
∆ ✲ Γ,∀xAµX
(→∀)
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7. universal—subject to the side condition S ,Ξt,µ ⊲ t : µ:
∆,∀xAµX ,A[t/x]
µ
X ,t
✲ Γ
∆,∀xAµX ✲ Γ
(∀→)
∆ ✲ Γ,∃xAµX ,A[t/x]
µ
X ,t
∆ ✲ Γ,∃xAµX
(→∃)
A S -proof or S -derivation for a sequent ∆ ✲ Γ is a tree built by application of these inference
figures (in such a way that any side conditions are met for regime S ), with instances of the axiom as
leaves and with the sequent ∆ ✲ Γ at the root. A tree similarly constructed except for containing
some arbitrary sequent S as a leaf is a derivation from S.
I state the correctness theorem for this proof theory in a way that highlights the continuity with
previous work on modal logic, particularly [Fitting, 1983].
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness) Suppose there is an S -proof for a sequent ✲ A.
Then A is valid. Conversely, if there is no S -proof for the sequent ✲ A then there is a model M
(that respects S ) and world w such that M ,w 6 − A.
I merely sketch a proof here, which involves simply applying the standard techniques of
[Fitting, 1983, Lincoln and Shankar, 1994]. It is convenient to prove an intermediate result, using
slightly modified sequent calculus SCE which imposes an eigenvariable condition on the possi-
bility and existential rules—u must be new. We can show the soundness of SCE by adapting the
arguments presented in [Fitting, 1983, 2.3] and [Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, 5.3]. Meanwhile,
we can follow [Fitting, 1983] in developing the completeness argument in terms of analytic con-
sistency properties for the modal language. This argument can be seen as a formalization of the
motivation for sequent calculi in the systematic search for models. Now, modal formulas may
be satisfied only in infinite models, so the completeness theorem effectively requires us to con-
sider infinite sequences of applications of sequent rules. In moving to infinite sets in this way, we
must formally move from deductions, viewed as syntactic objects, to a more abstract, algebraic
characterization of sets of modal formulas.
We can now establish the correctness of SCL by syntactic methods, which relate SCL proofs to
SCE proofs. Suppose Γ and ∆ contains sentences of L(CONST) (labeled with the empty prefix).
Completeness is immediate: if there is an SCE proof for Γ ✲ ∆, that very proof is also an
SCL proof of Γ ✲ ∆. Conversely, the soundness theorem says that if there is an SCL proof of
Γ ✲ ∆, then there is an SCE proof for Γ ✲ ∆. We establish this by simply adapting the general
Herbrand theorem of [Lincoln and Shankar, 1994] to SCE. The idea behind the soundness result is
that the structure of Herbrand terms provides enough information to reconfigure an SCL proof (by
an inductive process of interchanges of inference, like that considered next in Section 2.4) so that
equivalents of the eigenvariable conditions are enforced. The SCL proof may then be reindexed to
respect SCE’s eigenvariable requirements.
2.4 Permutability of inference and uniform proofs
Our syntactic methods for reasoning about derivations exploit permutability of inference—the gen-
eral ability to transform derivations so that inferences are interchanged [Kleene, 1951]. To develop
the notion of permutability of inference, we need to make some observations about the SCL se-
quent rules. First, the reasoning that is performed in subderivations is reasoning about subformulas
(and vice versa). That is, in any spur sequent, the occurrence of the principal expression and the
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side expression all correspond to—or as we shall say, are based in—the occurrence of the prin-
cipal expression in the base sequent. Likewise, each of the remaining expressions in the spur are
based in an occurrence of an identical expression in the base. Here, as in [Kleene, 1951], we are
assuming an analysis of each inference to specify this correspondence in the case where the same
expression has multiple occurrences in the base or in a spur. Thus, our proof techniques, where
they involve copying derivations, sometimes involve (implicit) reanalyses of inferences.
Now, in any derivation, the spur of one inference serves as the base for an adjacent inference
or an axiom. We can therefore associate any tracked prefixed formula occurrence E in any sequent
in the derivation with the occurrence in the root (or end-sequent) which E is based in. A similar
notion can relate inferences, as follows. Suppose O is the inference at the root of a (sub)derivation,
and L is another inference in the (sub)derivation. Then L is based in an expression E in the spur of
O if the principal expression of L is based in E; L is based in O itself if E is a side expression of
O. An important special case is that of an axiom based in an inference O. In effect, such an axiom
marks a contribution that inference O contributes to completing the deduction.
To define interchanges of inference, we appeal to the two basic operations of contraction and
weakening, which we cast as transformations on proofs. (In other proof systems, contraction and
weakening may be introduced as explicit structural rules.)
Lemma 1 (Weakening) Let D be an SCL proof, let ∆0 be a finite multiset of tracked prefixed
definitions and let Γ0 be a finite multiset of tracked prefixed goals (in the same language as D).
Denote by ∆0 +D + Γ0 a derivation exactly like D , except that where any node in D carries
∆ ✲ Γ, the corresponding node in ∆0 +D +Γ0 carries ∆,∆0 ✲ Γ,Γ0. (When ∆0 or Γ0 is
empty, we drop the corresponding + from the notation.) Then ∆0 +D +Γ0 is also an SCL proof.
Lemma 2 (Contraction) Let D be an SCL proof whose root carries ∆ ✲ Γ,E,E. Then we can
construct an SCL proof D ′ whose root carries ∆ ✲ Γ,E, whose height is at most the height of
D and where there is a one-to-one correspondence (also preserving order of inferences) that takes
any inference of D ′ to an inference with the same principal and side expressions in D . We can
likewise transform an SCL proof D whose root carries ∆,E,E ✲ Γ into an SCL proof D ′ whose
root carries ∆,E ✲ Γ.
These lemmas follow from straightforward induction on the structure of derivations. These con-
sequences continue to hold, suitably adapted, for the intermediate proof systems that we will con-
struct from SCL in later sections.
Now consider two adjacent inferences in a derivation, a base inference R and an inference S
(whose base is a spur of R). If S is not based in R, we may replace the derivation rooted at the
base of R by a new derivation of the same end-sequent in which S applies at the root, R applies
adjacent, and the remaining subderivations are copied from the original derivation (but possibly
weakened to reflect the availability of additional logical premises). Performing such a replacement
constitutes an interchange of rules R and S and demonstrates the permutability of R over S; see
[Kleene, 1951]. SCL is formulated so that any such pair of inferences may be exchanged in this
way.
We also observe that we can correctly introduce an abbreviation for goal occurrences of
✷i(A ⊃ B) by a single formula (A >i B) and the consolidation of corresponding inferences (→✷i)
22 DISJUNCTION AND MODULAR PROOF SEARCH
and (→⊃) into a single figure (→>i), while retaining unrestricted interchange of inference. Again
when the inference applies to principal AµX , the figure is formulated using η for ηuA(µ,X) as:
Γ,AµηX ,µη ✲ B
µη
X ,µη,A >i B
µ
X ,∆
Γ ✲ A >i BµX ,∆
→>i
We will refer to the calculus using (→>i) in place of (→ ✷i) and (→⊃) as SCLI, and consider
SCLI in the sequel.
[Miller, 1994, Miller, 1996] uses Definition 16 to characterize abstract logic programming lan-
guages.
Definition 16 A cut-free sequent proof D is uniform if for for every subproof D ′ of D and for
every non-atomic formula occurrence B in the right-hand side of the end-sequent of D ′ there is a
proof D ′′ that is equal to D ′ up to a permutation of inferences and is such that the base inference
in D ′′ introduces the top-level logical connective of B.
Definition 17 A logic with a sequent calculus proof system is an abstract logic programming lan-
guage if restricting to uniform proofs does not lose completeness.
It is easy to show that the sequent calculi SCL and SCLI are abstract logic programming languages
in this sense. In fact, by this definition every SCL or SCLI derivation is uniform.
To anticipate our analysis of permutability in later sections, let us introduce the notion of an
eager derivation in SCL or SCLI.
Definition 18 Consider a derivation D containing a right inference R that applies to principal E.
R is delayed exactly when there is a subderivation D ′ of D where: D ′ contains R; D ′ has a left
inference L at the root; and the principal E of R is based in an occurrence of E in the end-sequent
of D ′.
Consider this schematic diagram of such a subderivation D ′:
.
.
.
. . .E . . .
↓
R
. . .E . . . L
On an intuitive conception of a sequent proof as a record of proof search constructed from root
upwards, R is delayed in that we have waited in D to apply R until after consulting the program by
applying L, when we might have applied R earlier. Thus, we will also say in the circumstances of
Definition 18 that R is delayed with respect to L.
Definition 19 D is eager exactly when it contains no delayed applications of right rules.
By transforming any derivation D into an eager derivation D ′ by permutations of inferences, we
make it clear that reasoning about goals can always precede reasoning with program statements,
and thereby provide a starting point for further analysis of goal-directed proof search.
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Theorem 2 Any SCL(I) derivation D is equal to an eager derivation D ′ up to permutations of
inferences.
The proof follows [Kleene, 1951, Theorem 2]. A double induction transforms each derivation
into an eager one; the inner induction rectifies the final rule of a derivation whose subderivations
are eager by an interchange of inferences (and induction) [Kleene, 1951, Lemma 10]; the outer
one rectifies a derivation by rectifying the furthest violation from the root (and induction). See
Appendix A.
3 Modular goal-directed proof search
3.1 Overview
Eager derivations do not make a satisfactory specification for goal-directed proof in a logic pro-
gramming sense, because they do not embody a particularly directed search strategy. For one thing,
eager derivations are free to work in parallel on different disjuncts of a goal using different program
statements; in logic programming we want segments in which a single program statement and a
single goal is in force. Moreover, eager derivations can reuse work across separate case analyses;
in logic programming we want blocks where particular cases are investigated separately. Finally,
because of their classical formulation, eager derivations do not enforce or exploit any modularity
in their underlying logic. Our task is to remedy these faults of eager derivations.
Our result takes the form of an alternative sequent calculus SCLP which is equivalent to SCL.
SCLP enforces a strictly goal-directed proof search through the structure of its inferences. First,
SCLP sequents take the form
Γ;U ✲ V ;∆
We understand Γ to specify the global program and ∆ to specify the global restart goals; both are
multisets of tracked, prefixed formulas. U is at most one tracked, prefix formula, representing the
current program statement; V is at most one tracked, prefixed formula, representing the current
goal.
Logical rules apply only to the current program statement and the current goal. In addition, if
there is a current program statement U then the current goal V must be an atomic formula. Thus,
the interpreter first breaks the goal down into its components. Once an atomic goal is derived,
the program is consulted; the selected program statement is decomposed and matched against the
current goal by applicable logical rules. The form of the (⊃→) figure ensures that the interpreter
continues to work on at most one goal at any time; this gives SCLP proofs their segment structure.
Meanwhile, the form of the (∨ →) figures specify no current goal in its second case. The new
current goal can then be chosen flexibly from possible restart goals. This gives SCLP proofs their
block structure.
The new inferences are presented in Definition 20 and 21. Definition 20 shows the rules for
decomposing program statements; Definition 21 shows the rules for decomposing goals.
Definition 20 (Logic programming calculus—programs) The following inference figures de-
scribe the logic programming sequent calculus SCLP as it applies to program statements.
1. axiom—A atomic:
Γ;Aν ✲ Aν;∆
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2. decision (program consultation)—again A atomic:
Γ,PµX ;P
µ
X
✲ AνY ;∆
Γ,PµX ; ✲ AνY ;∆
decide
3. conjunctive:
Γ;PµX ✲ AνY ;∆
Γ;P∧QµX ✲ AνY ;∆ ∧→L
Γ;QµX ✲ AνY ;∆
Γ;P∧QµX ✲ AνY ;∆ ∧→R
4. disjunctive:
Γ;PµX ✲ AνY ;∆ Γ,QµX ; ✲ ;∆
Γ;P∨QµX ✲ AνY ;∆
∨→L
Γ;QµX ✲ AνY ;∆ Γ,PµX ; ✲ ;∆
Γ;P∨QµX ✲ AνY ;∆
∨→R
5. implication:
Γ; ✲ QµX ;∆ Γ;PµX ✲ AνY ;∆
Γ;Q ⊃ PµX ✲ AνY ;∆ ⊃→
6. necessity—subject to the side condition that there is a typing derivation S ,Ξν ⊲µ/µν : i:
Γ;PµνX ,µν ✲ A
ν′
Y ;∆
Γ,✷iPµX ✲ A
ν′
Y ;∆
✷i →
7. existential—subject to the side condition that h is hu∃xP(µ,X) for some u:
Γ;P[h/x])µX ,h ✲ A
ν
Y ;∆
Γ;∃x.PµX ✲ AνY ;∆
∃→
8. universal—subject to the side condition that there is a typing derivation S ,Ξt,µ ⊲ t : µ:
Γ;P[t/x]µX ,t ✲ A
ν
Y ;∆
Γ;∀x.PµX ✲ AνY ;∆
∀→
Definition 21 (Logic programming calculus—goals) The following inference figures describe
the logic programming sequent calculus SCLP as it applies to goals.
1. restart:
Γ; ✲ GνX ;GνX ,∆
Γ; ✲ ;GνX ,∆
restart
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2. conjunctive goals:
Γ; ✲ FµX ;∆ Γ; ✲ G
µ
X ;∆
Γ; ✲ F∧GµX ;∆
→∧
3. disjunctive goals:
Γ; ✲ FµX ;∆
Γ; ✲ F∨GµX ;∆
→∨L
Γ; ✲ GµX ;∆
Γ; ✲ F∨GµX ;∆
→∨R
4. necessary goals—where η is ηuA(µ,X) for AµX the principal of the rule and for some u for
which ηuA does not occur in ∆ or Γ:
Γ,FµηX ,µη; ✲ G
µη
X ,µη;G
µη
X ,µη,∆
Γ; ✲ F >i GµX ;∆
→✷i ⊃
Γ; ✲ GµηX ,η;G
µη
X ,µη,∆
Γ; ✲ ✷iGµX ;∆
→ ✷i
5. universal goals—subject to the side condition that h is hu∀xG(µ,X) for some u:
Γ; ✲ G[h/x]µX ,h;∆
Γ; ✲ ∀x.GµX ;∆
→∀
6. existential goals—subject to the side condition that there is a typing derivation S ,Ξt,µ ⊲ t : µ:
Γ; ✲ G[t/x]µX ,t;∆
Γ; ✲ ∃x.GµX ;∆
→∃
Inspection of the figures of Definitions 20 and 21 reveals the following generalization of mod-
ularity and locality: in any derivation, the label of the current program statement must be a prefix
of the label of the current goal. Moreover, goal labels are always extended with novel symbols,
because of the eigenvariable condition in the (→ ✷) figure. Inductively, these facts determine a
strong invariant—consider a block beginning with a restart inference whose spur is
Γ; ✲ GνX ;∆
and consider any expression PµY in Γ. If µ is not a prefix of ν, then µ will not be a prefix of the label
of any goal formula in the block. Thus PµY cannot be used in the block. (Compare [Stone, 1999,
Lemma 2].)
This is why the (restart) rule of SCLP can be made modular, so that it limits the work that
is reanalyzed to the scope of the ambiguity just introduced. We must simply show that the new
disjunct will contribute to its restart goal. In particular, define canceled blocks as in Definition 23.
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Definition 22 (Linked) An expression E in a sequent in an SCLU derivation D is linked if the
principal formula of an axiom in the same block of D as that sequent is based in E. An inference
R is linked in D if some side expression of R is linked in each spur of R. A derivation or block is
linked iff all of the inferences in it are linked.
Definition 23 (Canceled) A block is canceled if it contains the root of D , or if the side expression
E of the (∨→) inference whose spur is the root of the block is linked.
Thus a canceled block includes a use of any disjunctive case introduced in the block. The key fact
about SCLP is that it suffices to consider only canceled blocks in proof search.
Theorem 3 Let Γ and ∆ be multisets of tracked prefixed expression in which each formula is
tracked by the empty set and prefixed by the empty prefix. There is a proof of Γ ✲ ∆ in SCL
exactly when there is a proof of Γ; ✲ ;∆ in SCLP in which every block is canceled.
The discussion of the following subsections represents an outline of the proof of this result. The
strategy is to transform eager proofs from SCL to SCLP by a series of refinements of sequent rules
that make the logic programming strategy explicit. We give force to the idea that the interpreter
has a current goal and current program statement, in Section 3.2. Then we create blocks for case
analysis, in Section 3.3. Finally, we enforce modularity, in Section 3.4. See also Appendix B.
Figure 6 shows how the proof of Figure 5 is recast in SCLP. Figure 6 extends Figure 5 to make
the bookkeeping of goal-directed proof explicit. In Figure 6, the informal underline of Figure 5 is
gone, and instead the current goal and the current program statement are displayed at distinguished
positions in sequents. New (restart) and (decide) inferences mark the consideration of new goals
and new program statements. Of course, the logical content of the two inferences is identical.
Applying Definition 23, block 1 is canceled because it contains the root; there is no new disjunct
to discharge here. Block 3′ is canceled: the inference whose spur is the root of block 3′ is
the (∨ →L) and its side expression is an occurrence of B, the new disjunct in the block. This
occurrence is linked in the block because of the leftmost axiom . . . ;B ✲ B;F which is based in
it; the inference (∨→L) is linked in the block for the same reason. Similarly block 2′ is canceled
because the new disjunct C (the side expression of the (∨→R) inference whose spur is the root of
block 2′ ) contributes to the leftmost axiom . . . ;C ✲ C;F in the block.
Figure 7 shows how the proof of Figure 2 is recast in SCLP. The most dramatic change here
is that the inferences of Figure 7 are segmented out into three blocks. Another change is the
discipline of explicit scope; we introduce a suitable term α to represent the generic context in
which we prove✷A and another suitable term β to represent the generic context in which we prove
✷C. Correspondingly, we transition to α in using ✷(A∨B) and transition to β in using ✷(C∨D).
In the (restarts) of 5 and 6 the changes interact. In 5 we pick the modular restart Aα in order to
permit a contribution by the new assumption Bα. In 6 we pick the modular restart Cβ in order to
permit a contribution by the new assumption Dβ.
3.2 Segment structure
Our first task is to formalize goal-directed search that directs attention to a single goal at a time. To
distinguish such goals, we begin with a trick that for now is purely formal—introducing an articu-
lated SCLI. We represent assumptions as a pair Π;Γ with Π encoding the global program and Γ en-
coding local program statements; eventually local statements will be processed only in the current
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2′
. . . ;C ✲ C;F
. . . ,C; ✲ C;F (decide). . . ;F ✲ F;F
C, . . . ;C ⊃ F ✲ F;F (⊃→)
C ⊃ F,C . . . ; ✲ F;F (decide)
A∨B,C∨D,A ⊃ F,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F,B,C; ✲ ;F (restart)
3′
. . . ;B ✲ B;F
B, . . . ; ✲ B;F (decide)
. . . ;D ✲ D;F 2′
. . . ;C∨D ✲ D;F (∨→R)
C∨D, . . . ; ✲ D;F (decide)
C∨D,B, . . . ; ✲ B∧D;F (→∧) . . . ;F ✲ F;F
C∨D,B, . . . ;(B∧D)⊃ F ✲ F;F (⊃→)
C∨D,(B∧D)⊃ F,B, . . . ; ✲ F;F (decide)
A∨B,C∨D,A ⊃ F,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F,B; ✲ ;F (restart)
1
. . . ;A ✲ A;F 3′
. . . ;A∨B ✲ A;F (∨→L)
A∨B, . . . ; ✲ A;F (decide). . . ;F ✲ F;F
A∨B, . . . ;A ⊃ F ✲ F;F (⊃→)
A∨B,A⊃ F, . . . ; ✲ F ;F (decide)
A∨B,C∨D,A ⊃ F,C ⊃ F,(B∧D)⊃ F; ✲ ;F (restart)
Figure 6: The SCLP presentation of the proof of Figure 5.
segment and then discarded. (Compare the similar notation and treatment from [Girard, 1993].)
Similarly, we represent goals as a pair ∆;Θ, with Θ encoding the restart goals and ∆ encoding the
local goals; ultimately, we will also describe inference rules which will discard ∆ between seg-
ments. With this representation, principal formulas of logical rules are local formulas, in Γ or ∆;
so are the side formulas—with these exceptions: the (→✷) and (→>) rules augment Π instead of
Γ (when they add a new program statement) and Θ instead of ∆ (when they add new restart goals).
New (decide) and (restart) rules keep this change general; they allow a global formula—a
program statement or restart goal—to be selected and added to the local state.
Π,AµX ;Γ,A
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ
Π,AµX ;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ
(decide) Π;Γ
✲ ∆,GµX ;Θ,G
µ
X
Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ,GµX
(restart)
Lemma 3 (Articulation) Every SCLI deduction can be converted into an articulated SCLI deduc-
tion with an end-sequent of the form Π; ✲ ;Θ in such a way that if the initial derivation is eager
then so is the resulting derivation (and vice versa).
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5
. . . ;Bα ✲ Bα; . . .
. . . ,Bα; ✲ Bα; . . . (decide). . . ;Aα ✲ Aα; . . .
Bα, . . . ;B ⊃ Aα ✲ Aα; . . . (⊃→)
Bα, . . . ;✷(B ⊃ A) ✲ Aα; . . . (✷→)
✷(B ⊃ A),Bα; ✲ Aα; . . . (decide)
✷(A∨B),✷(B ⊃ A),✷(C∨D),✷(D ⊃C),Bα; ✲ ;Aα,(✷A)∧ (✷C) (restart)
6
. . . ;Dβ ✲ Dβ; . . .
. . . ,Dβ; ✲ Dβ; . . . (decide). . . ;Cβ ✲ Cβ; . . .
Dβ, . . . ;D ⊃Cβ ✲ Cβ; . . . (⊃→)
Dβ, . . . ;✷(D ⊃C) ✲ Cβ; . . . (✷→)
✷(D ⊃C),Dβ; ✲ Cβ; . . . (decide)
✷(A∨B),✷(B ⊃ A),✷(C∨D),✷(D ⊃C),Dβ; ✲ ;Cβ,(✷A)∧ (✷C) (restart)
4
. . . ;Aα ✲ Aα; . . . 5
. . . ;A∨Bα ✲ Aα; . . . (∨→L)
. . . ;✷(A∨B) ✲ Aα; . . . (✷→)
✷(A∨B), . . . ; ✲ Aα; . . . (decide)
✷(A∨B), . . . ; ✲ ✷A; . . . (→✷)
. . . ;Cβ ✲ Cβ; . . . 6
. . . ;C∨Dβ ✲ Cβ; . . . (∨→L)
. . . ;✷(C∨D) ✲ Cβ; . . . (✷→)
✷(C∨D), . . . ; ✲ Cβ; . . . (decide)
✷(C∨D), . . . ; ✲ ✷C; . . . (→✷)
✷(A∨B),✷(C∨D), . . . ; ✲ (✷A)∧ (✷C); . . . (→∧)
✷(A∨B),✷(B ⊃ A),✷(C∨D),✷(D ⊃C); ✲ ;(✷A)∧ (✷C) (restart)
Figure 7: The SCLP presentation of the proof of Figure 2. We suppress tracking of formulas and
hide the internal structure of Herbrand terms.
Proof. Straightforward structural induction.
The next step is to introduce an inference figure (⊃→S) that imposes a segment structure on
derivations, thus:
Π; ✲ AµX ,∆;Θ Π;Γ,A ⊃ B
µ
X ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ
Π;Γ,A ⊃ BµX ✲ ∆;Θ
(⊃→S)
Definition 24 (Segment) A segment in a derivation D is a maximal tree of contiguous inferences
in which the left subtree of any (⊃→S) inference is omitted.
The distinctive feature of the (⊃→S) figure is that the local results inferred from the program are
discarded in the subderivation where the new goal is introduced. In an eager derivation, this will
begin a new segment where first the new goal will be considered and then a new program statement
will be selected to establish that goal.
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We will define two calculi using (⊃→S). The first, SCLS, eliminates the (⊃→) inference of
the articulated SCLI and instead has (⊃→S). The second, SCLV, is a calculus like the articulated
SCLI but also allows (⊃→S); (⊃→) and (⊃→S) can appear anywhere in an SCLV derivation. We
introduce SCLV to facilitate the incremental transformation of articulated SCLI proofs into SCLS
proofs.
Lemma 4 An eager articulated SCLI derivation whose end-sequent is of the form
Π;→ ∆;Θ
can be transformed to an eager SCLS derivation of the same end-sequent.
Proof. We proceed with an inductive construction that eliminates (⊃→) inferences in favor of
(⊃→S) inferences one at a time. See Appendix B.1.
3.3 Block structure
We now revise how we perform case analysis from assumptions. We introduce new rules where all
local work is discarded in the subderivation written on the right. This corresponds to a sequent of
the form Π; ✲ ;Θ. In addition, some global work may be discarded in the right subderivation; this
helps clarify the structure of derivations. Accordingly, there may be additional formula occurrences
Π′ and Θ′ in the base sequent that are not copied up to the right subderivation. Finally, the right
subderivation may address either the (textually) first disjunct or the second disjunct. This leads to
the two inference figures below.
Π,Π′;Γ,A∨Bµ,Aµ ✲ ∆;Θ,Θ′ Π,Bµ; ✲ ;Θ
Π,Π′;Γ,A∨Bµ ✲ ∆;Θ,Θ′ ∨→
B
L
Π,Π′;Γ,A∨Bµ,Bµ ✲ ∆;Θ,Θ′ Π,Aµ; ✲ ;Θ
Π,Π′;Γ,A∨Bµ ✲ ∆;Θ,Θ′ ∨→
B
R
We call these inferences blocking (∨ →) inferences, or (∨ →B) inferences. We will appeal to
two calculi in which these inferences appear. The first, SCLU, permits both ordinary (∨→) and
(∨ →B) inferences, without restriction. SCLU is convenient for describing transformations be-
tween proofs. The second, SCLB, permits (∨→B) inferences but not ordinary (∨→) inferences.
Blocks are more than just boundaries in the proof; they provide a locus for enforcing modular-
ity. We will ensure that a disjunct contributes inferences to the new block where it is introduced.
Thanks to this contribution, we can narrow down the choice of goals to restart in a modular way.
This result is made possible only by maintaining the right structure as we introduce (∨ →B)
inferences. We use path prefixes to make explicit connections between program statements and any
goals that they help establish. The key notions are spanning, simplicity and balance for sequents.
Spanned, simple and balanced sequents represent a consistent evolution of the state of proof search,
which records a full set of restart goals and the corresponding assumptions, with no redundancy.
Definition 25 (Carrier) The carrier of a non-empty Herbrand prefix µη is BµηX ,µη if η is ηuA>iB(µ,X)
and otherwise, when η is ηu
✷iA(µ,X), is A
µη
X ,µη.
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Definition 26 (Spanned) Say one multiset of tracked prefixed formulas, Π, is spanned by another,
Θ, if for every expression occurrence AµX in Π and every non-empty prefix ν of µ there is an occur-
rence of the carrier of ν in Θ. It is easy to see there is a minimal set Θ that spans Π and that such
Θ spans itself. A sequent Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ is spanned if Π is spanned by Θ, Γ is spanned by Θ, ∆
is spanned by Θ and Θ is spanned by Θ. A derivation or block is spanned if every sequent in it is
spanned.
Definition 27 (Simple) A multiset Ψ is simple if no expression occurs multiple times in Ψ; a
sequent of the form Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ is simple if Π and Θ are simple. A derivation or block is simple
iff every sequent in it is simple.
Definition 28 (Balanced) A pair of multisets of tracked, prefixed formulas Π,Θ is balanced if
• for any η = ηuB>iC(µ,X), η occurs in Θ exactly when the expression B
µη
X ,µη occurs in Π and
exactly when the expression CµηX ,µη occurs in Θ; and
• for any η = ηu
✷A(µ,X), η occurs in Θ exactly when the expression A
µ
X ,µη occurs in Θ.
A sequent Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ is balanced if the pair Π,Θ is balanced. A block or derivation is balanced
if every sequent in the block is balanced.
We use the notion of an isolated block to obtain an even stronger characterization of proof
search that proceeds in a well-regimented way. In an isolated block, the only expressions preserved
across a blocking inference are those that are in some sense intrinsic to the restart problem created
by that inference. Specifically, each nested block must begin with the same end-sequent as the
outer block, except for additional program statements that have to be added in order to introduce
the newly-assumed disjunct, and the further goal and program statements required to obtain a
balanced and spanned sequent.
Definition 29 (Isolated) Let D be an SCLU derivation, and let B be a block of D . Write the end-
sequent of B as Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ and consider the right subproof of some (∨→B) inference L at the
boundary of B has an end-sequent of the form Π′,E; ✲ ;Θ′. The exported expressions in Π′, Π′e,
consist of the occurrences of expressions F in Π′ such that either is F based in an occurrence of
F in Π or is based in an occurrence of F as the side expression of an inference in which E is also
based.
B is isolated if the right subproof of each (∨ →B) inference L at the boundary of B has an
end-sequent of the form Π′,E; ✲ ;Θ′ meeting the following conditions: E is the side-expression
of L; Θ′ is the minimal multiset of expressions which spans Π′e,E,Θ and includes Θ; and Π′ is the
smallest multiset including Π′e,E for which Π′,Θ′ is balanced. D is isolated iff every block of D is
isolated.
Isolation allows us to keep close tabs on the uses of formulas within blocks, which is important
for establishing modularity later. In particular, isolation provides a key notion in formalizing the
obvious fact that an inference that makes no contribution to an SCLU derivation can be omitted.
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Finally at this stage, we refine the form of proofs which we are willing to count as goal-directed.
Now it will often happen that, while each block of a derivation may be eager, the derivation as a
whole will not be eager. As observed in [Nadathur and Loveland, 1995], derivations with blocks
can nevertheless be seen as eager throughout by reconstructing the (restart) rule as backchaining
against the negation of a subgoal. But we will simply consider blockwise eager derivations from
now on.
Definition 30 (Blockwise delayed) R is blockwise delayed exactly when there is a tree of con-
tiguous inferences D ′ within a single block of D where: D ′ contains R; D ′ has a left inference L
at the root; and the principal E of R is based in an occurrence of E in the end-sequent of D ′.
Definition 31 (Blockwise eager) D is blockwise eager exactly when it contains no blockwise de-
layed applications of right rules.
Obviously, we can use weakening to transform an SCLB or SCLU derivation into a SCLS
derivation, so the blocking inference figures are sound. The completeness of SCLB is a conse-
quence of Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 We are given a blockwise eager SCLS derivation D whose end-sequent is spanned and
balanced and takes the form:
Π; ✲ ;Θ
We transform D into a blockwise eager SCLB derivation in which every block is canceled, linked,
isolated, simple, balanced and spanned.
Proof. We can transform individual blocks to achieve a streamlined form, which already implicitly
reflects the logic programming search strategy of focused search on particular goals and program
statements. By pursuing a suitable ordering strategy as we inductively repeat this inductive trans-
formation, we can create the desired SCLB proofs with an overall modular block structure. See
Appendix B.2.
3.4 Modularity
We now derive SCLP from SCLB. SCLP proofs can be rewritten to SCLB rules by a weakening
transformation. Conversely, rewriting SCLB proofs to SCLP proofs is accomplished by induction
on the structure of proofs. The transformation is possible because multiple formulas in sequents
are needed only for passing ambiguities and work done across branches in the search; this is ruled
out by the use of (∨→BL), (∨→BR) and (⊃→S).
Lemma 6 Given a blockwise eager SCLB derivation D , with end-sequent
Π; ✲ ;Θ
in which every block is linked, simple and spanned, we can construct a corresponding SCLP
derivation of the same end-sequent in which every block remains linked.
Proof. By induction on the structure of proofs. See Appendix B.3.
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4 Assessment and conclusions
To execute modal specifications requires leveraging both the flexibility of efficient classical
theorem-proving and the distinctive modularity of modal logic. This is a significant problem be-
cause the two are at odds. On the one hand, flexible search strategies impose no constraints on
the relationships among inferences. By ignoring modularity, they can leave open inappropriate
possibilities for search. On the other hand, brute-force modular systems may place such strong
constraints on the order in which search must proceed that it becomes impossible to guide that
search in a predictable, goal-directed way. In this paper, we have explored one strategy for bal-
ancing the flexibility of classical goal-directed search with the modularity of modal logic. This
strategy culminates in the development of a modular logic programming sequent calculus SCLP.
[Stone, 1998b] describes a preliminary implementation of proof search in SCLP as a logic pro-
gramming interpreter DIALUP. I close by summarizing how (Section 4.1) and no less importantly
why (Section 4.2) I developed this implementation.
4.1 Implementation
An effective implementation of SCLP requires further treatments of unification and search control.
In general, to implement first-order sequent calculus proof search, we must lift the inference
figures. That is, we adapt the inferences that require instantiation to specific terms so that they
introduce logic variables instead. As we construct the proof, we accumulate constraints on the
values of these variables—for example, we get constraints when an axiom link in the proof re-
quires two formulas to be identical. In the lifted system, each proof we find represents the set of
ground proofs that you get by replacing the variables with values that satisfy the constraints. Lift-
ing is the essence of the resolution procedure [Robinson, 1965] but can be regarded as a general
metatheoretical strategy. [Lincoln and Shankar, 1994, Voronkov, 1996] offer particularly general
discussions of this strategy at its most sophisticated.
For first-order modal inference in prefixed calculi, lifting introduces two kinds of logic vari-
ables, and two corresponding kinds of constraints. First-order quantifiers introduce logic vari-
ables over individuals, subject to the familiar constraints that give rise to term unification prob-
lems. Modal inferences, meanwhile, introduce logic variables over prefixes, subject to path
equations. This leads to specialized problems of equational unification; good solutions are
known for the general setting of multi-modal logic; see for example [Auffray and Enjalbert, 1992,
Debart et al., 1992, Otten and Kreitz, 1996, Schmidt, 1998].
The logical fragment of SCLP makes path equations particularly simple. Inspection of the
SCLP proof rules shows that, at any point in proof search, we have enough path constraints to
determine ground substitutions for all the path variables in the sequent except possibly for variables
in the current program statement that are about to be unified with a goal. In many cases, this makes
path equations easy to solve—a compact representation of all possible solutions can be computed
in polynomial time. The details are beyond the scope of this paper, but see [Stone, 1998b].
Search control is the other issue. An implementation has to make commitments about what
statements to try and what rules to use to process those statements. The fact that SCLP program
and goal statements are labeled with ground prefixes means that we can easily test that a statement’s
label is a prefix of the goal label before attempting to match the statement and the goal. We can
also identify an atomic subformula of the statement nondeterministically as the head, and commit
to match that head with the goal. Before doing so, we can for example test that the head and the
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goal share the same predicate symbol.
In the case of disjunction, we also want to make sure that we avoid reporting duplicate proofs,
despite the duplicate rules for disjunction that we have. Loveland considers a number of heuristics
for this [Loveland, 1991], and we expect that they apply in SCLP as well as in Near-Horn Prolog.
But here is another heuristic. As motivated in Section 1.1.3, (∨→R) is required only for cancel-
lation. When we use it, we expect to cancel an assumption (like B in Figure 5) that could not be
canceled otherwise. We can make this precise: (∨→R) should only be used in a restart block, and
the assumption that is canceled in that block ought not to be used in the subsequent restart block
initiated by the (∨→R) inference. Otherwise, we will independently construct an alternative proof
that uses (∨→L) instead. Naturally, the kind of block analysis illustrated in the proof of Theorem 3
can be used to show that this restriction is complete.
4.2 Applications in modal representation
In classical logic, indefinite information is a bit exotic. Rather than developing an indefinite spec-
ification, we much prefer to collect the additional information required to describe the world in a
precise, definite way. This is not true at all with modal specifications. Modal specifications get
much of their interest from their ability to contrast different perspectives or sources of information.
What one source of information represents with specific, definite information, another source rep-
resents with abstract, indefinite information. Computation from modal specifications involves the
coordinated exchange of information between these sources.
In particular, problems of planning [Stone, 1998a] and problems of communication
[Stone, 2000] depend on indefinite modal specifications. In planning, one agent, the sched-
uler, has to allocate a task to another agent, the executive. (The executive may just be the
scheduler at a later point in time!) It is unrealistic to expect that the scheduler will know ex-
actly what the executive will do; this almost certainly requires information that is not avail-
able to the scheduler. Rather, the scheduler should merely know what the executive can
do. This means that, to be useful, the scheduler must have an indefinite modal specification
that abstractly describes the information that will be available to the executive. For exam-
ples, see [Moore, 1985, Morgenstern, 1987, Scherl and Levesque, 1993, Davis, 1994] as well as
[Stone, 1998a].
In communication, the task of one agent, the speaker, is to formulate an utterance that allows
another agent, the hearer, to answer a question. There are many cases where the speaker does not
have enough information to answer the question directly. However, the speaker can still design an
utterance that allows the hearer to infer the right answer, because the hearer knows something the
speaker does not. Concretely, a user of a computer interface might want to know what action to
take next. The right answer might be for the user to type jdoe into a certain text box. The speaker
might know to say enter your user ID, even if the speaker does not know what the user ID is. Again,
the speaker can make such choices meaningfully only from an indefinite modal specification that
says what the hearer knows abstractly but not definitely. See [Stone, 2000] for a worked-out formal
case study.
A Proof of Theorem 2
Any SCL(I) derivation D is equal to an eager derivation D ′ up to permutations of inferences.
The proof depends on a generalization of delayed inferences, which we can term misplaced
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inferences since we intend to eliminate them. We assume an overall derivation D , and consider a
right inference R that applies to principal E within some subderivation D ′ of D .
Definition 32 We say a right inference R is right-based on an inference R′ in D if R = R′ or R is
based on R′ and every inference on which R is based above and including R′ is a right inference.
Then R is misplaced in D ′ exactly when there are inferences M and R′ in D ′ such that, in D , M is
based on an inference L, R is right-based on R′, and R′ is delayed with respect to L.
In this case we will also say R is misplaced with respect to M. We can abstract a key case of
misplaced inferences by the following schematic derivation:
R
Right inferences and infer-
ences R not based in
{
.
.
.
M
R′ delayed wrt L
(M based in L)
{
. . .E . . .
↓
R′
. . .E . . . L
This schematic derivation shows informally how misplaced inferences help provide an inductive
characterization of the inferences that stand in the way of obtaining an eager derivation. In an eager
derivation, it will be impossible for R to appear above L. For R′ cannot be delayed with respect
to L, but once R′ and L are interchanged, we will obtain a new delayed inference that R is based
in, until finally we must interchange L and R. Of course, to do this, we must first interchange R
with the misplaced inferences, such as M, which stand between R and L and cannot themselves be
interchanged with L because they are based in L.
Observe that the relation R is misplaced with respect to M is asymmetrical. To see this, suppose
R is misplaced with respect to M. By definition, R is right-based on R′ which is delayed with respect
to a left inference L on which M is based. Meanwhile, for M to be misplaced with respect to R,
by definition, we must have M right-based on M′ and R based in some left rule LR. Any such
M′ would have to be based in L since no left inferences intervene between M and M′; M′ must
thus appear inside a schematic like that above. At the same time, since no left inferences intervene
between R and R′, R′ would have to be based in any such LR, which must thus appear outside such a
schematic, closer to the root of the overall derivation. Accordingly, any such LR must occur closer
to the root of D than L; meanwhile the principal of M′ is introduced further from the root than L.
So we will not have M′ delayed with respect to LR.
Call R badly misplaced in D ′ if R is misplaced with respect to M and M occurs closer to the
root than R. A subderivation D ′ with no badly misplaced inferences will be called good. An overall
good derivation is also eager, since any delayed inference is badly misplaced.
We can now present the proof in full using a lemma.
Lemma 7 Consider a subderivation D ′ of an overall derivation D , with the property that D ′ has
good immediate subderivations and that D ′ ends in inference M. From D ′ we can construct a
derivation with the same end-sequent that is good.
Proof. The assumption that the immediate subderivations of D ′ are good is a very powerful one.
For suppose that some inference is badly misplaced with respect to some other in D ′. Then we can
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only have some rule R badly misplaced with respect to M—anything else would contradict that
assumption.
In fact, we can show that some such R must be adjacent to M. Consider an inference S that
intervenes between R and M: we will show that S must be badly misplaced with respect to M too.
By the definition of misplaced, M is based on some left rule L in D , R is right-based on R′, and
R′ is delayed with respect to L. Now consider the inferences that S is based on above L. If any
of these is a left inference L′, or S is itself a left inference, then R is also misplaced with respect
to S—indeed, badly misplaced. This contradicts the assumption that the subderivations of D ′ are
good. So none of these inferences can be a left inference, which means S is a right inference that is
right-based on some inference S′ above L. S′ must be delayed with respect to L. Hence S is badly
misplaced with respect to M.
Now we can proceed after [Kleene, 1951, Lemma 10]. Define the grade of D ′ as the number of
badly misplaced inferences in D ′. We show by induction on the grade that D ′ can be transformed
to a good one.
The base case is a derivation of grade 0. This case has D ′ itself good. Thus, suppose the lemma
holds for derivations of grade g, and consider D ′ of grade g+1. By the argument just given, one
immediate subderivation—call it D ′′—must end with an inference R which is badly misplaced
with respect to M. Such an R of course cannot be based in M, so we interchange inferences R and
M. In the result, the subderivation(s) ending in M satisfy the condition of the lemma with grade g
or less. By applying the induction hypothesis, we can replace these subderivations with good ones.
By asymmetry, M is not now badly misplaced with respect to R, nor can any of the other inferences
be badly misplaced with respect to R, since they were not so in the original derivation. It follows
that the result is a good derivation.
Now, continuing the proof of Theorem 2, define the reluctance of D to be the number of
rule applications R such that the subderivation DR of D rooted in R is not good. We proceed by
induction on reluctance. If reluctance is zero, D is itself good.
Now suppose the theorem holds for derivations of reluctance d, and consider D of reluctance
d+ 1. Since D is finite, there must be a highest inference R such that some inference is badly
misplaced with respect to R in the subderivation DR rooted at R. This DR satisfies the condition of
Lemma 7. Therefore this DR can be replaced with a corresponding eager derivation, giving a new
derivation of smaller reluctance. The induction hypothesis then shows that the resulting derivation
can be made eager.
B Proof of Theorem 3
Let Γ and ∆ be multisets of tracked prefixed expressions in which each formula is tracked by the
empty set and prefixed by the empty prefix. There is a proof of Γ ✲ ∆ in SCL exactly when there
is a proof of Γ; ✲ ;∆ in SCLP in which every block is canceled.
Proof. As observed already in Section 2.4, there is an SCL proof of Γ ✲ ∆ exactly when
there is an SCLI proof of Γ ✲ ∆. By Theorem 2 of Section 2.4, there is an SCLI proof of Γ ✲ ∆
exactly when there is an eager SCLI proof of Γ ✲ ∆. By Lemma 3, there is an eager SCLI proof
of Γ ✲ ∆ exactly when there is an eager articulated SCLI proof of Γ; ✲ ;∆. And by Lemma 4,
there is an eager articulated SCLI proof of Γ; ✲ ;∆ exactly when there is an eager SCLS proof of
Γ; ✲ ;∆.
Continuing through the argument, By the Contraction Lemma, we may assume without loss of
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generality that Γ; ✲ ;∆ is a simple sequent. We know from its lack of prefixes that the sequent
Γ; ✲ ;∆ is also spanned and balanced. By Lemma 5 of Section B.2.3, then, there is an eager
SCLS proof of Γ; ✲ ;∆ exactly when there is a blockwise eager SCLB derivation of Γ; ✲ ;∆ in
which every block is canceled, linked, isolated, simple, balanced and spanned. And by Lemma 6,
there is a blockwise eager SCLB derivation of Γ; ✲ ;∆ in which every block is canceled, linked,
isolated, simple, balanced and spanned exactly when there is an SCLP derivation of Γ; ✲ ;∆ in
which every inference is linked. And if every inference is linked, every block is canceled.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
We show in this section that an articulated SCLI proof with end-sequent Π; ✲ ;Θ corresponds
to an SCLS proof with end-sequent Π; ✲ ;Θ, and vice versa. In fact, to transform SCLS to
articulated SCLI we have a simple structural induction which replaces (⊃→S) with (⊃→) using
the weakening lemma; the soundness of SCLS over SCLI then follows by Lemma 3. Thus, here
we are primarily concerned with completeness of a new sequent inference figure.
The use of (⊃→S) in eager derivations ensures that the processing of each new goal refers
directly to global program statements. To formalize this idea, we introduce the notion of a fresh
inference.
Definition 33 (Fresh) Let D be an SCLV derivation. An inference R in D is fresh exactly when
R is a right inference and the path from R to the root never follows the left spur of any (⊃→)
inference.
Lemma 8 Let D be an eager SCLV derivation with an end-sequent of the form
Π;→ ∆;Θ
and consider a subderivation D ′ of D rooted in a fresh inference R. Then the end-sequent of D ′
also has the form
Π′;→ ∆′;Θ′
for some Π′, ∆′ and Θ′.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, and consider a maximal D ′ whose end-sequent contains a non-empty
multiset of local statements Γ. We can describe D ′ equivalently as the subderivation of D that is
rooted in a lowest fresh inference R when the end-sequent of D contains some local statements. R
cannot be the first inference of D , so there must be an inference S in D immediately below R. If S
is a left rule, then the fact that D is eager leads to a contradiction. R must be based in S, or else R
will be delayed. This means S is an implication inference; but given that R is fresh, R must appear
along the branch of (⊃→S) without local statements. Meanwhile, if S is a right rule, it follows
from the formulation of the rules that if the end-sequent of DR has non-empty local statements
then the end-sequent of DL must also. This contradicts the assumption that R is first.
Now we proceed with the proof of Lemma 4. We assume an eager SCLV derivation D with
such an end-sequent; we show that we can transform it into an eager SCLS derivation D ′ with the
same end-sequent. The proof is by induction on the number of occurrences of (⊃→) inferences in
D .
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In the base case, there are no (⊃→) inferences and D ′ is just D .
Suppose the claim holds for derivations where (⊃→) is used fewer than n times, and suppose
D is a derivation in which (⊃→) is used n times. Choose an inference L of (⊃→) with no other
(⊃→) inference closer to the root of D; we must rewrite the left subderivation at L to match the
(⊃→S) inference figure. We distinguish a subderivation D ′ of D as a function of L and draw
on the inferences in D ′ to replace this subderivation—in particular, we identify D ′ as the largest
subderivation of D containing L but no right inferences or segment boundaries below L.
Using Lemma 8, we develop a schema of D ′ thus:
DA
Π;Γ,A ⊃ BµX → A
µ
X ,∆;Θ
DB
Π;Γ,A ⊃ BµX ,B
µ
X → ∆;Θ
DL


Π;Γ,A ⊃ BµX ✲ ∆;Θ
.
.
.
Π; ✲ ∆;Θ
L
(Segment boundary or right rule)
We suppose L applies to an expression A ⊃ BµX ; the left subderivation of L, DA adds the goal A;
the right, DB, uses the assumption B. The subderivation of D ′ from the end-sequent of L abstracts
the left inferences performed elsewhere in this segment (and any subgoals that these inferences
trigger). We notate this tree of inferences DL. By Lemma 8, D ′ ends with a sequent of the form
Π; ✲ ∆;Θ. Because of the form of the intervening rules, we have the same succedent ∆;Θ at L,
as well as the same global statements Π.
We use DL to construct an eager SCLS derivation A corresponding to DA; we will substitute
the result for the left subtree at L to revise L to fit the (⊃→S) figure. In outline, the derivation we
aim for is an eager SCLS version of:
DA
DL +AµX
The problem is that if DA is rooted in a right inference to A, we will not obtain an eager derivation
when we reassemble L. The SCLS derivation A we use is actually constructed by recursion on the
structure of DA, applying this kind of transformation at appropriate junctures. At each stage, we
call the subderivation of DA we are considering D ′A.
For the base case, this subderivation is an axiom, and we construct this subderivation as a result.
If D ′A ends in a right rule, the construction proceeds inductively by constructing corresponding
subderivations and recombining them by the same right rule. With a right inference here, the
resulting derivation must be eager since the subderivations are eager.
If D ′A ends in a left inference, the construction is not inductive. We observe that D ′A has an
end-sequent of the form
Π,Π′; ✲ ∆,∆′;Θ,Θ′
(The inventory of expressions can only be expanded, and that only in certain places, as we follow
right inferences to reach D ′A.) So we first weaken DL by the needed additional expressions—Π′
on the left and ∆′ (locally) and Θ′ (globally) on the right; then we identify the open leaf in DL with
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D ′A, obtaining a larger derivation DI defined as:
D ′A
Π′+D ′L +AµX +∆′;Θ′
Any delayed inference in DI would in fact be delayed in D ′A, so this is an eager derivation. The
result has, moreover, fewer than n (⊃→) inferences, since it omits at least L from D ′. Then the
induction hypothesis applies to give the needed SCLS derivation A .
Given the derivation A so constructed, we substitute A for DA in D . The result D∗ is an eager
derivation; D∗ contains an (⊃→S) inference corresponding to L and therefore contains fewer than
n uses of (⊃→). The induction hypothesis applies to transform D∗ to the needed overall derivation.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
B.2.1 Replacing Herbrand terms
To begin, it is convenient to observe that the use of indexed Herbrand terms allows us to rename
Herbrand terms in a proof under certain conditions.
Lemma 9 (Substitution) Let D be an SCLU derivation with end-sequent
Π; ✲ ;Θ
in which no Herbrand terms or Herbrand prefixes appear; consider a spanned simple subderiva-
tion D ′ in which a modal Herbrand function ηuA occurs in some sequent, but does not occur in the
end-sequent. Let ηvA be a Herbrand function that does not occur in D . Then we can construct a
proof D∗ containing corresponding inferences in a corresponding order to D but in which Her-
brand terms and Herbrand prefixes are adjusted so that ηvA is used in place of ηuA precisely in the
subderivation corresponding to D ′.
The proof is by induction on the structure of derivations. A complex substitution may be required,
because the Herbrand calculus may require not only the replacement of ηuA itself but also the
replacement of Herbrand terms that depend indirectly on ηuA. It is convenient to begin by replacing
any first-order Herbrand term not introduced by a (∃ →) or (→ ∀) inference by a distinguished
constant c0—starting with leaves of the derivation and working downward. This replacement is
to ensure that each first-order and modal Herbrand term in D is determined from an expression in
the end-sequent of D by a finite number of steps of inference. We continue with the systematic
replacement of ηuA and its dependents. In both cases, the form of D ensures that a finite substitution
can systematically rename all these Herbrand terms as required. We use the fact that each sequent
is simple and spanned to extend this substitution inductively upward. Because each sequent is
spanned the substitution does not need to be extended at (✷→) inferences; because each sequent
is simple the substitution can be extended freshly at (→✷) and (→>) inferences. Finally, the form
of first-order Herbrand terms ensures that a finite extension of the substitution suffices for (→ ∃)
and (∀→) inferences. .
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B.2.2 Rectifying blocks
The transformation of individual blocks appeals to the following definition of required elements
of proofs.
Definition 34 (Required) Given a derivation D with end-sequent
Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ
we say that an expression occurrence E in Θ or Π is required iff either it is linked or some block
in D is adjacent to the root block and has an end-sequent
Π′; ✲ ;Θ′
in which Π′ or Θ′ contains an expression occurrence based in E.
Lemma 10 (Rectification) We are given a blockwise eager SCLU derivation D such that: every
block in D is canceled and isolated; every block in D other than the root is spanned, linked, bal-
anced and simple; and the end-sequent of D is balanced. We transform D to an SCLU derivation
D ′ in which every block is canceled, linked, isolated, balanced and simple and every block other
than the root is spanned. Every block in D ′ other than the root block is identical to a block of D;
and the inferences in the root block of D correspond to inferences in the same order in D (and so
D ′ is blockwise eager). If the end-sequent of D is spanned then D ′ is spanned and isolated.
Proof. We describe a transformation that establishes the following inductive property given D .
There are simple multisets ΠM ⊆ Π and ΘM ⊆ Θ, together with multisets Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such
that: any Θ′ that spans ΠM includes ΘM; and for any simple Π′ with ΠM ⊆Π′ ⊆Π and any simple
Θ′ with Θ′ ⊆Θ such that Π′ and Θ′ are spanned by Θ′ and the pair Π′,Θ′ is balanced, there is a D ′
in which every block is canceled, linked, balanced, balanced and simple, with end-sequent:
Π′;Γ′ ✲ ∆′;Θ′
In this D ′, each expression in Γ′ is linked; each expression in ∆′ is linked; each ΠM expression
that occurs in Π′ is required and each ΘM expression that occurs in Θ′ is linked. Every block in
D ′ other than the root block is identical to a block of D; and the inferences in the root block of D
correspond to inferences in the same order in D . Finally, if Γ′ and ∆′ are spanned by Θ′ then D ′ is
spanned; if D is linked then D ′ contains all the axioms of D .
At axioms, for D of
Π;Γ,AµX ✲ A
µ
Y ,∆;Θ
ΠM and ΘM are empty, while Γ′ = AµX and ∆′ = A
µ
X . Assume we are given simple Π′ from Π and
simple Θ′ from Θ with Π′ and Θ′ spanned by Θ′. We construct D ′ of
Π′;AµX ✲ A
µ
Y ;Θ
′
If AµX is spanned by Θ′, this axiom is spanned too; the remaining conditions are immediate.
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At inferences, consider as a representative case (∨→). D ends:
D1
Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,A
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ
D2
Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ
Π;Γ,A∨BµX ✲ ∆;Θ
The blocks of D1 and D2 either contain the root or are blocks from D; the Herbrand prefixes in the
end-sequents of D1 and D2 occur with the same distribution as in D . Therefore we can apply the
induction hypothesis to get ΠM1, ΘM1, Γ′1 and ∆′1 for D1; we can apply it to get ΠM2, ΘM2, Γ′2 and
∆′2 for D2. To transform D itself, we perform case analysis on Γ′1 and Γ′2.
If Γ′1 does not contain an occurrence of A
µ
X , then ΠM = ΠM1, ΘM = ΘM1, Γ′ = Γ′1 and ∆′ = ∆′1;
D ′1 suffices to carry through the induction hypothesis.
Similarly, if Γ′2 does not contain an occurrence of B
µ
X , then ΠM = ΠM2, ΘM = ΘM2, Γ′ = Γ′2
and ∆′ = ∆′2; D ′2 suffices to carry through the induction hypothesis.
Otherwise, we will set up ΠM = ΠM1∪ΠM2 and ΘM = ΘM1 ∪ΘM2 (as sets); by the inductive
characterization of ΠM1, ΠM2, ΘM1 and ΘM2, any Θ′ that spans both ΠM2 and ΠM2 includes both
ΘM1 and ΘM2. We also set up Γ′ as the multiset containing at least one occurrence of A∨BµX and
as many expression occurrences of any expression as either are found in Γ′1\A
µ
X or are found in
Γ′2\B
µ
X ; we set up ∆′ as the multiset containing as many expression occurrences of any expression
as are found in either ∆′1 or ∆′2.
To continue, we now consider simple Π′ from Π and simple Θ′ from Θ such that ΠM1 ⊆
Π′, ΠM2 ⊆ Π′, Π′ and Θ′ are spanned by Θ′, and the pair Π′,Θ′ is balanced. We know that Θ′
includes ΘM. We can apply the inductive property to transform D1 and D2 into derivations with
the inductive property:
D ′1
Π′;Γ′1 ✲ ∆′1;Θ′
D ′2
Π′;Γ′2 ✲ ∆′2;Θ′
We weaken the lowest block of D ′1 on the left by the expressions in Γ+ and not already in Γ′ and
on the right by the expressions in ∆+ and not already in ∆′, giving D+1 . We similarly weaken the
lowest block of D ′2 on the left by the expressions in Γ+ and not already in Γ′2 and on the right by
the expressions in ∆+ and not already in ∆′2, giving D
+
2 . Only the lowest blocks are affected by the
weakening transformations, so other blocks remain canceled, linked, spanned, isolated and simple;
the lowest block in each case remains canceled. The lowest blocks also remain linked since no
inferences are added; and they remain simple (and balanced) because no weakening occurs in the
global areas. Construct D ′ as
D+1
Π′;Γ+,AµX ✲ ∆+;Θ′
D+2
Π′;Γ+,BµX ✲ ∆+;Θ′
Π′;Γ+ ✲ ∆+;Θ′
The end-sequent is simple and balanced so the root block is simple and balanced; the inference is
linked since AµX and B
µ
X are linked in the subderivations, so the root block is linked. The root block
remains canceled as always.
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Any ΠM expression is required here because it is required either in D+1 in virtue of its mem-
bership in ΠM1 or in D+2 in virtue of its membership in ΠM2; likewise any ΘM expression is linked
here because it is linked either in D+1 in virtue of its membership in ΘM1 or in D
+
2 in virtue of
its membership in ΘM2. Thus, except for the spanning conditional, we have shown everything we
need of this D ′.
Finally, then, if Γ′ and ∆′ is spanned by Θ′, ∆′1 and ∆′2 are spanned by Θ′ and Γ′1 and Γ′2 are
spanned by Θ′ in the resulting (spanned) subderivations D ′1 and D ′2. This shows that the end-
sequent of D ′ is also spanned, so D ′ itself is spanned.
This reasoning is representative of the construction required also for (∧ →), (∃ →), (∀ →),
(→∧), (→∨), (→ ∃), (→ ∀), (decide) and (restart). It applies also for (⊃→S), with the obvious
caveat that we do not weaken the left subderivation to match local left expressions, since the form
of the (⊃→S) inference requires there to be none.
Next we have (∨→B); we consider the representative case of (∨→BL). D ends:
D1
Π0,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,A
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
D2
Π0,BµX ; ✲ Θ0
Π0,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
We treat this specially to respect the block boundary before D2. In particular, we apply the in-
duction hypothesis to D1 (as we may since its end-sequent has the same distribution of Herbrand
prefixes as does that of D), to get ΠM1, ΘM1, Γ′1 and ∆′1. If AµX does not occur in Γ′1, we let
ΠM = ΠM1, ΘM = ΘM1, Γ′ = Γ′1 and ∆′ = ∆′1; any derivation D ′1 constructed from appropriate Π′
and Θ′ suffices to carry through the induction hypothesis.
Otherwise, we get ΠM = ΠM1 ∪Πe0 (as a set), ΘM = ΘM1; any Θ′ that spans ΠM also spans
ΠM1 and so includes ΘM. ∆′ = ∆′1 and Γ′ contains Γ′1 with the occurrence of A
µ
X removed, together
with an occurrence of A∨BµX if Γ′1 does not already contain such an expression.
Assume simple Π′ with ΠM ⊆ Π′ ⊆ Π and simple Θ′ with Θ′ ⊆ Θ with Π′ and Θ′ spanned by
Θ′ and the pair Π′,Θ′ balanced. As before, we must have ΘM included in Θ′. We therefore obtain
D ′1 by the inductive property; we then weaken D ′1 locally within the lowest block by A∨B
µ
X on the
left if necessary, to obtain a good derivation D∗1 .
The needed D ′ is now constructed as:
D∗1
Π′;Γ′,AµX ✲ ∆′;Θ′
D2
Π0,BµX ; ✲ Θ0
Π′;Γ′ ✲ ∆′;Θ′
We first argue that the construction instantiates the (∨→BL) inference rule. Every Herbrand prefix
in Π0e and BµX occurs in Π′ or Γ′, so Π0e and B
µ
X are spanned by Θ′. But because the root block in D
is isolated, Π0e and BµX are spanned minimally by Θ0. Thus Θ0 ⊆ Θ′. Π0e ⊆ ΠM by construction;
by isolation Π0 is the smallest set such that the pair of Π0,Θ0 is balanced. But since Π′,Θ′ is
balanced, Π0 ⊆ Π′.
Now we show that D ′ so constructed has the needed properties. The end-sequent is simple and
balanced so the root block is simple and balanced. The inference is linked: AµX is linked in D ′1 by
the induction hypothesis; BµX is linked in D2 because D2 begins a new block which by assumption
is canceled. The root block remains canceled as always. Any ΠM expression is required here
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because either a corresponding expression Π0e in the new block at the left subderivation is based
on it, or because it is required in D ′1. Every ΘM is linked because it is linked in D∗1 .
Finally, if Γ′ and ∆′ are spanned by Θ′, then ∆′1 and Γ′1 are spanned by Θ′1. The new subderiva-
tion D ′1 is therefore spanned by the inductive property; this ensures that the overall derivation is
spanned.
Next consider (✷→). D ends:
D1
Π;Γ,✷iAµX ,A
µν
X ,µν
✲ ∆;Θ
Π;Γ,✷iAµX ✲ ∆;Θ
As always, we apply the induction hypothesis to D1 (as we may since the Herbrand prefixes on Π
and Θ formulas remain the same) to obtain ΠM1, ΘM1, Γ′1 and ∆′1. If AµνX ,µν does not occur in Γ′1, we
let ΠM = ΠM1, ΘM = ΘM1, Γ′ = Γ′1 and ∆′ = ∆′1; any subderivation D ′1 obtained by the inductive
property suffices to witness the inductive property for D .
Otherwise we obtain Γ′ by extending Γ′1 by the principal expression ✷iA
µ
X if necessary and
eliminating the side expression AµνX ,µν; ΠM = ΠM1, ΘM = ΘM1 and ∆′ = ∆′1. (Since these are
common to the subderivation, any Π′ that spans ΠM includes ΘM.) Now we consider Π′ with
ΠM ⊆ Π′ ⊆ Π and Θ′ with Θ′ ⊆ Θ, Π′ and Θ′ spanned by Θ′ and the pair Π′,Θ′ balanced. As
always, we have ΘM ⊆ Θ′. We obtain D ′1 using Π′ and Θ′, and weaken the lowest block by local
formulas; calling the result D+1 , we can produce D ′ by the following construction:
D+1
Π′;Γ′,AµνX ,µν ✲ ∆′;Θ′
Π′;Γ′ ✲ ∆′;Θ′
Everything is largely as before. The key new reasoning comes when we assume that Γ′ and ∆′
are spanned by Θ′. We must argue that Γ′,AµνX ,µν is in fact spanned by Θ′. Since A
µν
X ,µν is linked
in D+1 , there must be an axiom in this block which is based in A
µν
X ,µν; indeed, since the expression
occurs as a local antecedent, this axiom must occur within the segment. This axiom must pair
expressions prefixed by a path µ′ where µν is a prefix of µ′. But because D ′ remains blockwise
eager, no inferences apply to ∆′ or Θ′ formulas within the segment (nor can they in this fragment
augment the ∆′ or Θ′ formulas within the segment); therefore some ∆′ expression is associated
with Herbrand prefix µ′. But since ∆′ is spanned by Θ′, we have that every prefix of µ′ is associated
with some Θ′ expression; so every prefix of µν is associated with some Θ′ expression. Thus D+1 is
spanned and in turn D ′ is spanned.
We have one last representative class of inferences in D: (→✷) and (→>). We illustrate with
the case where D ends in (→>):
D1
Π,AµηX ,µη;Γ ✲ ∆,A >i B
µ
X ;Θ,B
µη
X ,µη
Π;Γ ✲ ∆,A >i BµX ;Θ
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We begin by applying the induction hypothesis to D1 (as we can, given the symmetric extension
of Π and Θ by labeled expressions). We obtain ΘM1, ΠM1, Γ′1 and ∆′1; we consider alternative
cases in response to Θ and ΘM1. First we suppose BµηX ,µη 6∈ Θ. It follows by our assumption about
D that AµηX ,µη 6∈ Π either, nor does η occur in Θ. For this case, we start by defining an overall ΠM
and ΘM: ΘM is ΘM1 with any occurrence of BµηX ,µη eliminated; ΠM is ΠM1 with any occurrence of
AµηX ,µη eliminated. ΠM contains no occurrences of µη, since Π does not; thus given the inductive
property of ΘM1 and ΠM1, any Θ′ that spans ΠM spans ΘM. We define Γ′ and ∆′ so that Γ′ = Γ′1
and ∆′ contains ∆′1 together with an occurrence of A >i B
µ
X , provided ∆′1 does not already contain
one and BµηX ,µη ∈ ΘM1 or A
µη
X ,µη ∈ ΠM1. So, assume we are given simple Π′ with ΠM ⊆ Π′ ⊆ Π and
simple Θ′ with Θ′ ⊆Θ (and so ΘM ⊆Θ′) such that Π′ and Θ′ are spanned by Θ′ and the pair Π′,Θ′
is balanced.
We consider whether BµηX ,µη ∈ ΘM1 or A
µη
X ,µη ∈ ΠM1. If neither, we apply the induction hypoth-
esis to D1 for the case that Θ′1 is Θ′ and Π′1 is Π′. The resulting derivation D ′1 serves as D ′.
Otherwise, BµηX ,µη ∈ ΘM1 or A
µη
X ,µη ∈ ΠM1; we apply the inductive property of D1 for the case
that Θ′1 is Θ′,B
µη
X ,µη and Π′1 is Π′,A
µη
X ,µη (clearly Π′1 and Θ′1 are spanned by Θ′1 assuming Π′ and Θ′
are spanned by Θ′; the pair Π′1,Θ′1 is also balanced given its symmetric extension). If BµηX ,µη ∈ΘM1,
by the inductive property it is linked. If AµηX ,µη ∈ ΠM1, it is required, but we shall show that it is in
fact linked. By the definition of being required, the other possibility is that there is a block adjacent
to the root block of D ′1 with end-sequent
Π′′,E; ✲ Θ′′
in which the (∨→B) inference R that bounds the block is based in E and Π′′,E or Θ′′ contains an
expression occurrence based in AµηX ,µη. But since the original block is isolated in the original D , it
is E that must be based in AµηX ,µη. But then R is based in A
µη
X ,µη and R is linked: in particular its side
expression in the left spur) must be linked; so AµηX ,µη is linked too.
Thus we can weaken D ′1 in its lowest block if necessary by A >i B
µ
X as a local right formula
(in Γ), producing D+1 ; D+1 remains good by the same argument as the earlier cases. Thus we can
construct D ′ as:
D+1
Π′,AµηX ,µη;Γ′ ✲ ∆′,A >i B
µ
X ;Θ′,B
µη
X ,µη
Π′;Γ′ ✲ ∆′;Θ′
The end-sequent here is simple and balanced, so the whole root block is simple and balanced.
The new inference is linked (in virtue of the linked occurrence of one side expression—AµηX ,µη or
BµηX ,µη) so the whole root block is linked. The root block is of course canceled. Each element of
ΠM is required because it is an element of ΠM1 and required in the immediate subderivation; each
element of ΘM is linked, because it is an element of ΘM1 and therefore linked in the immediate
subderivation.
To conclude the case, suppose the end-sequent of D is spanned and that Γ′ and ∆′ are spanned
by Θ′; it follows that same property applies to D1 so the subderivation is spanned. Then the end-
sequent must also be spanned.
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The alternative case has BµηX ,µη ∈ Θ. By assumption, it also has A
µη
X ,µη ∈ Π. We therefore define
an overall ΠM and ΘM directly as ΠM1 and ΘM1, respectively; similarly Γ′ = Γ′1 and ∆′ = ∆′1. To
construct the needed D ′ for appropriate Π′ and Θ′, we simply apply the induction hypothesis to
D1 for the case that Θ′1 is Θ′ and Π′1 is Π′. The resulting derivation D ′1 suffices.
Having completed the induction, we argue that we can obtain an overall D ′ that is isolated,
assuming the original D is not only isolated but spanned. Apply the inductive result to D for the
case Π′ = Π and Θ′ = Θ; since Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆ we obtain a spanned derivation D ′ ending
Π;Γ′ ✲ ∆′;Θ
Consider the end-sequent of any block other than the root in D ′; it is
Π0,E; ✲ ;Θ0
where a corresponding block occurs in D . I argue by contradiction that for any F ∈ Π0 either
F ∈ Π or F is based in an occurrence of F as the side expression of an inference in D ′ in which
E is also based. (This will show that D ′ is isolated.) So consider an exceptional F . Since D is
isolated, if F 6∈ Π, F is based in an occurrence of F as the side expression of an inference in D in
which E is also based; this inference introduces some path symbol η which occurs in the label of
F and E. In D ′, E can not be based in such an inference; otherwise F would also be based in that
inference, since D ′ is simple. (We have assumed that F is not based in such an inference.) But in
this case the expression in the end-sequent of D ′ on which E is based must contain η. Because the
end-sequent of D ′ is spanned the form of Π and Θ is constrained in D , F must occur in Π. This is
absurd.
We conclude Section B.2.2 by observing some facts about this construction. First, let D ′ be a
derivation obtained by the construction of Lemma 10, and suppose D ′ is weakened (in a spanned
and balanced way) to D ′′ by adding occurrences of global expressions that either already occur in
the end-sequent of D ′ or never occur as global expressions in D ′. Then a straightforward induction
shows that D ′ is obtained again from D ′′ by the construction of Lemma 10.
Second, observe that if D ′ is a derivation obtained by the construction of Lemma 10, and D ′′
is obtained from D ′′ by the renaming of Herbrand prefixes (as in Lemma 9), then straightforward
induction shows that D ′′ is obtained again from D ′′ by the construction of Lemma 10.
Third, let D ′ be a derivation for which the construction of Lemma 10 yields itself. Let ν be a
prefix and let the Π;Θ be the smallest balanced pair where Θ contains all the carriers of prefixes
of ν introduced in D ′. Suppose each expression in Π and Θ has the property that at most one
inference of D ′ has an occurrence of that expression as a side expression. Consider a derivation
D ′′ obtained from D ′ by weakening globally by Π (on the left) and by Θ (on the right). Let D∗ be
the result of applying the construction of Lemma 10 to D ′′. Then D∗ contains any subderivation
of D ′ whose end-sequent contains Π and Θ as global formulas. Again this is a straightforward
induction; the base case considers a subderivation of D ′ whose end-sequent contains Π and Θ as
global formulas; in this case we apply the first observation. Unary inferences extend the claim
immediately. At binary inferences, one subderivation must be unchanged, by the first observation:
since Π and Θ are introduced on a unique path, each Π and Θ formula never occurs or already
occurs in the end-sequent in that subderivation. Thus the other subderivation necessarily appears
in the derivation obtained by the construction of Lemma 10.
DISJUNCTION AND MODULAR PROOF SEARCH 45
B.2.3 Block conversion
We now have the background required to perform the conversion to block structure, and complete
the proof of Lemma 5.
We are given a blockwise eager SCLS derivation D whose end-sequent is spanned and bal-
anced and takes the form:
Π; ✲ ;Θ
We can transform D into a blockwise eager SCLB derivation in which every block is canceled,
linked, isolated, simple, balanced and spanned.
Proof. Our induction hypothesis is stronger than the lemma. We assume a blockwise eager
SCLU derivation D with end-sequent of the form
Π; ✲ ;Θ
in which every block is canceled, linked, isolated, simple, balanced and spanned, such that that
the subproof rooted at any (∨→) inference in D is an SCLS derivation. And we identify a dis-
tinguished expression occurrence E in the end-sequent of D which is linked. By Lemma 10, it
is straightforward to obtain such a derivation from the SCLS derivation (containing only a single
block) that we have assumed. We transform D into a blockwise eager SCLB derivation in which
every block is canceled, linked, isolated, simple, balanced and spanned and in which E is also
linked; we perform induction on the number of (∨→) inferences in D .
In the base case there are no (∨→) inferences, so D itself is an SCLB derivation.
In the inductive case, we assume D with n (∨→) inferences, and assume the hypothesis true
for derivations with fewer. We find an application L of (∨→) with no other closer to the root of
D . We will transform D to eliminate L.
Let D ′ denote the smallest subderivation of D containing the full block of D in which L oc-
curs. Explicitly, D ′ may be D itself; otherwise, D ′ is rooted at the right subderivation of the
highest (∨→B) inference below L—an inference we will refer to as H. In either case, our assump-
tions allow us to identify a distinguished linked expression F in the end-sequent of D ′: either the
assumed E from D , or the side expression of the inference H (assumed canceled). Suppose A∨BνY
is the principal of L. We can apply Lemma 9 to rename A∨BνY to A∨B
µ
X in such a way that each
symbol in µ that is introduced in D ′ is introduced by a unique inference there. Now we can infer
the following schema for D ′:

 D
A
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,A
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
DB
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
L


DL
Π0,F; ✲ ;Θ0
That is, the subderivation of D ′ below L isDL; the right subderivation above L (in which B is
assumed) is DB; the left is DA.
We will use the inferences from DL to construct alternative smaller derivations in place of
DA and DB. By Θ′, indicate the minimal set of formulas required in addition to Θ0 to span AµX ;
by Π′ indicate the minimal set of formulas required in addition to Π0,F and AµX to ensure that
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the pair given by Π0,Π′,F,AµX and Θ0,Θ′ is balanced. (This is well-defined because the sequent
Π0,F ✲ Θ0 is already spanned and balanced.) Now we can construct two new subderivations
D ′A and D ′B given respectively as follows:

 Π
′+AµX +DA +Θ′
Π0,F,Π,Π′,AµX ;Γ,A∨B
µ
X ,A
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ,Θ′
Π0,F,Π,Π′,AµX ;Γ,A∨B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ,Θ′
decide


Π′+AµX +DL +Θ′
Π0,F,Π′,AµX ; ✲ ;Θ0,Θ′
 [Π
′+BµX +D
B +Θ′]
Π0,F,Π,Π′,BµX ;Γ,B∨B
µ
X ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ,Θ′
Π0,F,Π,Π′,BµX ;Γ,B∨B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ,Θ′
decide


Π′+BµX +DL +Θ′
Π0,F,Π′,BµX ; ✲ ;Θ0,Θ′
That is, we weaken DA and DB by global versions of the side expression of inference L throughout
their lowest blocks; we apply a (decide) inference to obtain a new subderivation to substitute for
the subderivation rooted at L in DL. We weaken by sufficient additional formulas globally in the
lowest blocks to ensure that the end-sequents of these derivations are balanced and spanned.
Since we have changed only the lowest block here, and have ensured that this block remains
isolated and canceled, we can now apply Lemma 10 to obtain corresponding derivations DAI and
DBI in which every block is canceled, linked, isolated, simple, balanced and spanned. In light
of our first observation about the construction of Lemma 10, we can see that the inferences of
DA are preserved up to the new (decide) inference. And in light of our third observation about
the construction of Lemma 10, given the unique inferences introducing Θ0 and Π0, this (decide)
inference must be preserved in DAI . Thus A
µ
X is linked in DAI and for analogous reasons B
µ
X is
linked in DBI . These derivations satisfy the induction hypothesis as deductions with fewer than
n (∨→) inferences; we can apply the induction hypothesis with AµX and B
µ
X as the distinguished
linked formulas to preserve. This results in SCLB derivations A and B with the same end-sequents
as D ′A and D ′B, in which every block is canceled, linked, isolated, simple and spanned, and in
which respectively AµX and B
µ
X are linked.
We need only one of A and B to reconstruct D ′ using blocking inferences. For example, we
obtain a proof using (∨→BL) by using B in place of DB as schematized below:
 D
A
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,A
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
B
Π0,F,Π′,BµX ✲ Θ0,Θ′
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
∨→BL


DL
Π0,F; ✲ ;Θ0
In a complementary way, we obtain a proof using (∨→BR) by using A in place of DA as schematized
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below: 
 D
B
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
A
Π0,F,Π′,AµX ✲ Θ0,Θ′
Π0,F,Π;Γ,A∨BµX ✲ ∆;Θ0,Θ
∨→BL


DL
Π0,F; ✲ ;Θ0
Note that the root block is isolated in both cases, because we have added only as many formulas
to Π′ and Θ′ as are necessary to obtain a balanced, spanned sequent; the remaining expressions
originate in the end-sequent of the previous block, which we know was isolated. Thus, in both
cases, we have blockwise eager derivations in which every block is canceled, isolated, simple,
balanced and spanned, in which fewer than n (∨ →) inferences are used, and in which only the
root block may fail to be linked. We thus need to apply the construction of Lemma 10 again
to ensure that the root block is linked. It is possible for the distinguished occurrence of F not
to be linked in one of the resulting derivations, but not both. To see this, consider applying the
construction of Lemma 10 to D ′ itself, as a test: the result will be D ′ since D ′ is linked. Starting
from DA and DB and axioms elsewhere, each inference in D ′ corresponds to an inference in the
alternative derivations schematized above. We can argue by straightforward induction that no
formula is linked in the reconstructed D ′ unless it is also linked in the one of the corresponding
reconstructed alternative derivations. And F is linked in D ′.
Call the derivation in which F is linked D ′′; we substitute D ′′ for D ′ in D . Since F remains
linked in D ′′, when we do so, we obtain a blockwise eager SCLU derivation with an appropriate
end-sequent, with fewer original (∨ →) inferences, and in which every block remains canceled,
linked, isolated, simple, balanced and spanned, and in which (∨ →) inferences lie at the root
of SCLS derivations. Applying the induction hypothesis to the result gives the required SCLB
derivation.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 6
We are given a blockwise eager SCLB derivation D , with end-sequent
Π;Γ ✲ ∆;Θ
in which every block is linked, simple and spanned. We construct an SCLP derivation D ′ of which
four additional properties hold:
• the end-sequent of D ′ takes the form
Π;Γ′ ✲ ∆′;Θ
with Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆;
• D ′ contains in each segment or block all and only the axioms of the corresponding segment
or block of D;
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• whenever D ′ contains a sequent of the form
Π∗;Γ∗ → F;Θ∗
F is the only right formula on which an axiom in that block is based; and
• whenever D ′ contains a sequent of the form
Π∗;F → ∆∗;Θ∗
then F is the only left formula on which an axiom in that segment is based.
In the base case, D is
Π;Γ,AµX ✲ BνX,∆;Θ
and D ′ is
Π;AµX ✲ Bν;Θ
Supposing the claim true for proofs of height h, consider a proof D with height h+1. We consider
cases for the different rules with which D could end.
The treatment of (→ ∧) is representative of the case analysis for the right rules other than
(→>). D ends
Π; ✲ AµX ,A∧B
µ
X ,∆;Θ Π; ✲ B
µ
X ,A∧B
µ
X ,∆;Θ
Π; ✲ A∧BµX ,∆;Θ
→∧
(It is a consequence of Lemma 8 that in the initial derivation there is an empty local area.) We
simply apply the induction hypotheses to the immediate subderivations. If the resulting derivations
end with (restart), consider the immediate subderivation of the results, otherwise consider the
results themselves. These derivations end
Π; ✲ C;Θ
Π; ✲ D;Θ
We must have C = A; we know from the structure of D that A is linked, and A could not be linked
in D unless C = A since D ′ shows that all of the axioms in D derive from C. For the same reason
D = B. So we can combine the resulting proofs by an (→∧) inference to give the needed D ′.
The case of (→>) proceeds similarly, but relies on an additional observation. D ends
D1
Π,AµηX ,µη; ✲ ∆,A >i B
µ
X ;B
µη
X ,µη,Θ
Π; ✲ ∆,A >i BµX ;Θ
→>
We apply the induction hypothesis to D1 and eliminate any final (restart) inference. This gives us
a derivation D ′1 of
Π,AµηX ,µη; ✲ E;B
µη
X ,µη,Θ
If we know that the B-side expression of this inference is linked in this block, then we can conclude,
as before, that E is an occurrence of the expression BµηX ,µη. We show this as follows. We know from
the structure of D only that one of the A-expression and the B-expression must be linked. However,
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it is straightforward to show that no left expression AµηX ,µη is linked in an SCLP derivation with a
local goal CνY unless µη is a prefix of ν. (The argument is a straightforward variant for example
of [Stone, 1999, Lemma 2].) Since D is simple and spanned, η must be new; BµηX ,µη is the only
expression whose associated path term has µη as a prefix.
Thus, we construct D ′ using an SCLP inference as
D ′1
Π,AµηX ,µη; ✲ B
µη
X ,µη;B
µη
X ,µη,Θ
Π; ✲ A >i BµX ;Θ
→>
Now suppose D ends in a left rule other than (⊃→S) or (∨→B). We take (∧→) as a repre-
sentative case; then D is:
D1
Π;Γ,A∧BµX ,A
µ
X ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ
Π;Γ,A∧BµX ✲ ∆;Θ
∧→
Apply the induction hypothesis to D1. If the result ends in a (decide) inference, let D ′1 be the im-
mediate subderivation of the result; otherwise let D ′1 be the result itself. D ′1 is an SCLP derivation
with an end-sequent of the form:
Π;E ✲ F;Θ
E must be a side expression of the inference in question, here (∧→); otherwise the corresponding
inference could not have been linked in D . One of the inference figures (∧→L) and (∧→R) must
apply depending on which side expression E is. For concrete illustration, we suppose E is AµX ; then
we construct D ′ as:
D ′1
Π;AµX ✲ F;Θ
Π;A∧BµX ✲ F ;Θ
∧→L
Next, we suppose D ends in (⊃→S), as follows:
D1
Π; ✲ AµX ,∆;Θ
D2
Π;Γ,A ⊃ BµX ,B
µ
X
✲ ∆;Θ
Π;Γ,A ⊃ BµX ✲ ∆;Θ
⊃→S
We begin by applying the induction hypothesis to the subderivation D1. After stripping off any
(restart), we obtain an SCLP derivation D1 with end-sequent
Π; ✲ C;Θ
By the usual linking argument, the expression C must be identical to AµX . We then apply the
induction hypothesis also to the right subderivation. Again, after stripping off any (decide), we get
an SCLP derivation D2 with end-sequent
Π;D ✲ E;Θ
By the usual linking argument, D must in fact be identical to BµX . Thus we obtain the needed D ′
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by combining the two derivations by the SCLP (⊃→) rule:
D ′1
Π; ✲ AµX ;Θ
D ′2
Π;BµX ✲ E;Θ
Π;A ⊃ BµX ✲ E;Θ
⊃→
Finally, for (∨→B), we consider the representative case of D as schematized below:
D1
Π;Γ,AµX ✲ ∆;Θ
D2
Π′,BµX ; ✲ ;Θ′
Π;Γ,A∨BµX ✲ ∆;Θ
∨→BL
We begin by applying the induction hypothesis to D1, the subderivation in the current block; if
necessary, we strip off any initial (decide) inference, obtaining D ′1 with an end-sequent that by
linking takes the form:
Π;AµX ✲ E;Θ
Next, we apply the induction hypothesis to the other subderivation. Since both local areas are
empty in the input subderivation, they remain empty in the result subderivation: this gives D ′2 with
end-sequent:
Π′,BµX ; ✲ ;Θ
′
The two subderivations can be recombined by the SCLP (∨ →L) inference to obtain the needed
D ′:
D ′1
Π;AµX ✲ E;Θ
D ′2
Π′,BµX ; ✲ ;Θ′
Π;A∨BµX ; ✲ E;Θ
∨→L
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